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Facilitating Money Judgment Enforcement
Between Canada and the United States
JAMES P. GEORGE†
The United States has attempted for years to create a more efficient enforcement regime for
foreign-country judgments, both by treaty and statute. Long negotiations succeeded in July 2019,
when the Hague Conference on Private International Law (with U.S. participants, including the
Uniform Law Commission) promulgated the new Hague Judgments Convention which
harmonizes judgment recognition standards but leaves the domestication process to the enforcing
jurisdiction. In August 2019, the Uniform Law Commission took a significant step to fill that gap,
though limited to Canadian judgments. The Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments
Act provides a registration process similar to that for sister-state judgments in the United States.
The new Act aligns with Canada’s Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, retaining
due process safeguards while facilitating acceptance of appropriate judgments. In most cases,
this will avoid the need for further litigation and lead to more efficient enforcement in adopting
jurisdictions. This Article outlines the new Act and then tackles difficult questions that remain
subject to local law.

† Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. The Author thanks Committee Chair Lisa
Jacobs and National Conference Reporter Kathy Patchell, and each member of the drafting committee for their
excellent dialogue and result with the Act. The Author also thanks Kaitlin Wolff and other staff members at the
Uniform Law Commission, Texas A&M Reference Librarian Cynthia Burress, and administrative assistant
Andrea Hudson, all of whom contributed significantly to the Act and this Article. The conclusions, opinions,
and any errors are mine and not those of the Uniform Law Commission, the drafting committee, or the people
thanked here.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2019, the Uniform Law Commission approved an act that will
streamline the process to enforce a Canadian money judgment in the United
States. The Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act (“2019
Registration Act”) supplements the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgment
Recognition Act (“2005 Act”) currently adopted in twenty-six states and
territories.1 Under the 2005 Act, a party must file a lawsuit in order to seek
recognition for a foreign judgment, and if granted, it may enforce the foreign
judgment in the same manner as a judgment rendered locally. The 2019
Registration Act creates a registration procedure for use with Canadian money
judgments which does not require the party seeking recognition to file a lawsuit.
This Article explains the 2019 Registration Act and its relation both to its parent
Act and to the Canadian counterpart, the Canadian Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act.
This Article deals intricately with those three statutes and incidentally with
several others, all of which are popularly referred to with acronyms such as
UFCMJRA. Because of the acronyms’ similarity and the likelihood of
confusion, I will use shortened forms. There are three United States-based acts,
all aimed at state adoption:
• “the 1962 Act” is the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
• “the 2005 Act” is the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act
• “the 2019 Registration Act” is the Uniform Registration of Canadian
Money Judgments Act

There are two Canadian acts, adopted in various Canadian provinces and
territories:
• “the REJA-C” is the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act
• “the UEFJA-C” is the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act

Part I discusses the history of these acts.
In addition, readers must distinguish between a judgment’s recognition (the
enforcing state’s acceptance of a foreign judgment for preclusion or enforcement
purposes) and the judgment’s enforcement (execution against local assets). In
turn, recognition breaks down into recognition standards (such as the judgment
debtor’s amenability to the rendering state’s jurisdiction) and the initial
application process in the enforcing state (litigation versus registration). Part II
discusses the application process—registration—offered by the 2019
Registration Act.
Part III discusses the myriad of conflicting issues encountered following
judgment registration under the 2019 Registration Act or filing under the 2005
Act. Although judgment execution per se is beyond these Acts’ scope, it is
1. For a list of enacting jurisdictions, see 2005 Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIF.
L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=ae280c30-094a4d8f-b722-8dcd614a8f3e (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
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important that attorneys and courts understand both the distinction and interplay
of the judgment recognition and the ensuing enforcement process. Part IV
summarizes the 2019 Registration Act’s contribution and speculates as to the
viability of registration in other judgment enforcement regimes.

I. FOREIGN-COUNTRY JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
A. THE UNITED STATES
1. The Common Law
As Joseph Story noted in the early nineteenth century, foreign judgment
recognition has been the subject of “no inconsiderable fluctuation” in the
common law.2 In chronicling this fluctuation, Story first noted a frequent
distinction in England between judgments offered for enforcement and those
offered in defense. Judgments filed for enforcement were treated as prima facie
evidence of the claim subject to attack for various errors—that is, the claim was
often relitigated. But judgments offered in defense were analyzed under
preclusion principles.3 Using that practice as a starting point, Story offered
several pages of variations ranging from moderations to sharp deviations from
the English view.4 The United States at that point had insufficient legal history
to draw conclusions. Story reported only the generality that foreign judgments
were prima facie evidence but impeachable, and that “how far and to what extent
this doctrine is to be carried, does not seem to be definitely settled.”5
The United States Supreme Court took a large step in 1895 to straighten
the fluctuation in its review of a French judgment. In Hilton v. Guyot,6 the Court
explained at length that foreign-country judgments are entitled to recognition
under twin standards of comity and reciprocity. As to comity, the Court stated
we are satisfied that, where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon
regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of
other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or
in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation should not
allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in

2. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO
CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS,
SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS § 603 (Lawbook Exch. 2d ed. 2001) (1841).
3. See id. § 598.
4. See id. §§ 598–610; see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 180–95 (1895).
5. STORY, supra note 2, § 608; see also Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns 157, 169 (N.Y. 1808) and other cases
and treatises discussed in PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, & CHRISTOPHER A.
WHYTOCK, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1421–22 (West Acad. Publ’g 6th ed. 2018).
6. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 113.
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this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal,
upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was erroneous in law
or in fact.7

The Court—and on this second point a bare majority—held further that
comity required reciprocity, and because France did not give conclusive effect
to United States judgments, the Court would not recognize the French
judgment.8 A strong four-justice dissent favored the French judgment, arguing
that preclusion was the common law mandate here rather than the more
politically oriented comity, and that reciprocity had no role in the analysis.9 The
Hilton majority thus held that the question of foreign-country judgment
recognition was one of public law, conceivably addressable by a national or
international standard. The Hilton dissent argued for preclusion, a question of
the common law and thus private law. That question—public law or private
law—continues to be debated in regard to foreign country judgment recognition.
The next instance of that ongoing debate came from the New York Court
of Appeals in 1926. In Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, the
New York Court of Appeals rejected Hilton’s comity and reciprocity standard,
and instead followed the Hilton dissent by applying New York’s common law
of preclusion to the French judgment’s recognition.10 Johnston’s holding made
two important points. First, the recognition of the French judgment was a
question of private law based on preclusion, and not public law based on comity.
Second, because it was a question of private law, it was a state law question
governed by New York law.
The state law view was bolstered in 1938 when the Supreme Court decided
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, holding that diversity cases were governed by
the law of the state in which the federal court sat.11 Although Erie applied only
to federal courts (and not, for example, to state court actions on foreign-country
judgments), the doctrine came to stand for something much broader than the
governing law in diversity cases. For example, in Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp.,12 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals cited Erie in holding
that Pennsylvania law governed the recognition of an English default
judgment.13 Interestingly, Pennsylvania’s applicable law was comity, based on
Hilton, but rejected Hilton’s reciprocity.14 In any event, Erie clarified the
primacy of state common law even outside of federal litigation, including its
application to what the Hilton majority assumed was a question of public law
and national scope. To the extent the Hilton majority purported to announce a
federal standard for recognizing foreign-country judgments, the combination of
7. Id. at 202–03.
8. Id. at 210.
9. Id. at 233–34.
10. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 386–88 (1926).
11. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
12. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1017 (1972).
13. Id. at 440.
14. Id. at 440 & n.8.
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Johnston and Erie has ended that. Nonetheless, state courts are free to adhere to
Hilton’s comity and reciprocity standard, and some do.15 On the other hand, state
law’s current dominance of foreign-country judgment recognition does not mean
that federal law cannot control the question, but only that in the absence of
federal law—federal statute or treaty—state law controls.
2. The Uniform Acts
In 1948, the Uniform Law Commission approved the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (US-UEFJA) to provide clearer
enforcement of sister-state judgments. Although the US-UEFJA was merely a
codification of the common law standard under full faith and credit, it expedited
sister-state judgment enforcement by requiring only a registration rather than a
new lawsuit. The sister-state Act had sufficient success16 to encourage the
Uniform Law Commission to consider a similar act for foreign-country
judgments.
That happened in 1962 with the promulgation of the Uniform Foreign
Money Judgment Act (“1962 Act”). As the California Supreme Court noted,
“[t]he purpose of the uniform act was to codify the most prevalent common law
rules for recognizing foreign money judgments and thereby encourage the
reciprocal recognition of United States judgments in other countries.”17 There
were, of course, a number of differences from the sister-state Act. Notably, first,
the sister-state Act applies to any judgment entitled to full faith and credit18 but
the 1962 Act applies only to money judgments other than those for taxes, fines,
other penalties, or family law judgments.19 Second, the 1962 Act does not allow
for mere registration of the foreign-country judgment but instead requires
“recognition” accomplished through a new lawsuit,20 although the 1962 Act
itself did not make that clear.21 Third, the 1962 Act allows for both preclusion
15. See HAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 1424–25 & n.305.
16. As of 2019, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (U.S.) has been enacted in forty-eight
states (all but California and Vermont) plus the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 1964
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/
community-home?CommunityKey=e70884d0-db03-414d-b19a-f617bf3e25a3 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
17. Manco Contracting Co. (W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian, 195 P.3d 604, 608 (Cal. 2008) (citing 13 pt. II West’s
U. Laws Ann. (2002) Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Prefatory Note, p. 40).
18. See UNIF. ENF’T OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 1 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1964).
19. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY -JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1962).
20. For sister-state judgments, full faith and credit requires recognition when a qualified judgment is
registered. Because foreign-country judgments do not qualify for full faith and credit, a summary proceeding is
necessary.
21. The drafters apparently believed that the need to file a new action in the enforcing state was obvious
since it was required under the common law. That oversight was one of the reasons for the revisions that came
in 2005 with the Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6 cmt. 1 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005). In the meantime, states had varying
reactions to the 1962 Act’s failure to specify a filing requirement. Florida saw it as acceptable to use a registration
procedure that the drafters did not intend. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.604 (2019). No other state drafted a
registration procedure as such, but some courts interpreted it that way. See, e.g., Vrozos v. Sarantopoulos, 552
N.E.2d 1093, 1099–1101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Maxwell Shuman & Co. v. Edwards, 663 S.E.2d 329, 331–32
(N.C. Ct. App. 2008). A Texas court, on the other hand, held the 1962 Act unconstitutional for its failure to
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and enforcement.22 Finally, the 1962 Act provides additional defenses and
protections for the judgment debtor.23 The 1962 Act was eventually adopted by
thirty-five states and three territories,24 but several have replaced it with the 2005
Act. As of 2019, ten states and one territory use the 1962 Act—Alaska,
Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands.25
The 1962 Act’s failure to provide an express procedure, along with other
perceived shortcomings, led to an updated Act in 2005. The changes from the
1962 Act are explained in the 2005 Act’s prefatory note and include clarifying
(in some cases enlarging) the definitions,26 scope,27 burdens of proof,28 need to
file a legal action in the enforcing state,29 defenses,30 and the addition of a statute
of limitations.31 The 2005 Act has been adopted in twenty-six U.S. jurisdictions:
Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.32

require notice to the judgment debtor. See Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(denying writ of mandamus). As a result, the Texas legislature amended its version of the 1962 Act to specify a
notice requirement. See Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enterprises, Ltd., 794 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex.
1990).
22. Whether the foreign-country judgment is presented for collection or preclusion, it first requires
recognition as a qualified judgment. For sister-state judgments, recognition is automatic so there is no need for
a summary proceeding when submitting it for preclusion, which will necessarily be in an existing action.
Enforcing the sister-state judgment, which usually means collecting a money judgment, requires registration
under the US-UEFJA in order to give notice to the judgment debtor and to open a domestic cause number. See
generally UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS R ECOGNITION ACT.
23. In addition to the jurisdictional defenses under the sister-state act, the 1962 Act includes defenses such
as unfair legal system and public policy violations that are unavailable under the sister state act. See id. § 4.
24. HAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 1425.
25. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY J UDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, U.L.A. Refs & Annos (2020). The
Uniform Laws Annotated reference table lists Delaware and Illinois, but those states also appear on the 2005
Act reference table and both show current versions of the 2005 Act.
26. See UNIF. FOREIGN -COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 2 (refining the definitions to
read “foreign country” and “foreign-country judgment”).
27. See id. § 3 (clarifying certain exclusions such as domestic relations judgments).
28. The judgment creditor or other party seeking recognition bears the initial burden to establish that the
judgment falls within the Act’s scope. See id. § 3(c). Once that burden is met, the judgment is presumed
enforceable and the judgment debtor (or other party opposing recognition) bears the burden of establishing a
basis for nonrecognition. See id. § 4(d).
29. See id. § 6.
30. See id. §§ 4(c)(7)–(8) (adding discretionary nonrecognition grounds based on the rendering court’s
integrity and due process violations in foreign proceedings). The best explanation of defense distinctions
between the 1962 Act and the 2005 Act comes from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in DeJoria v. Maghreb
Petroleum Exploration, S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 386 (5th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter DeJoria I], rev’d, 935 F.3d 381 (5th
Cir. 2019) [hereinafter DeJoria II]. In DeJoria II, the judgment debtor successfully opposed a Moroccan
judgment by lobbying the Texas legislature to adopt the 2005 Act which added crucial defenses. DeJoria, 935
F.3d at 387–88.
31. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 9.
32. See 2005 Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, supra note 1.
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3. Proposals for a National Standard—Treaty or Unilateral Statute
As noted above, state law governance of foreign-country judgment
recognition is not a foregone conclusion. National standards have been
continuously proposed at least back to Hilton. The most notable effort, which
may now succeed in the United States, is through the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, which in 1993 began drafting a Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments. The process continued through
2001, but negotiations reached impasses on jurisdictional bases such as “tag
jurisdiction” and “general jurisdiction” (doing business in the forum unrelated
to the claim). When it became clear that no agreement was in sight, the
negotiators took a fallback position and crafted an agreement on forum clauses
that became the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.33
During the Hague negotiations, the American Law Institute (ALI)
undertook the drafting of a federal statute designed to implement the anticipated
Hague Judgments Convention. The ALI work began in 1998,34 and when the
Hague efforts failed, the ALI switched the plan to creating a federal statute that
would create a federal standard for recognizing foreign-country judgments.
Controversies during that process included some ALI members’ resistance to a
federal standard, and other members’ preference for a reciprocity requirement.35
That work was completed in 2005 with a proposed federal statute that included
reciprocity,36 but it did not reach Congress.
Treaty proponents did not give up, and in 2019 the Hague Conference
finalized the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.37 The Convention states the
standards for recognition including jurisdiction, defenses, and authentication,38
but leaves the filing or registration procedure, along with enforcement, up to the
enforcing state’s law.39 Additionally, the Convention expressly retains the
enforcing states’ existing recognition and enforcement methods.40 The
Convention opened for signing on July 2, 2019, but as of this writing only
Uruguay has signed.41 Ratification in the United States is of course speculative,
33. See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 44 I.L.M. 1294 (2005), https://assets.hcch.net/
docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-e0972510d98b.pdf. The United States has signed but not ratified the
convention. See Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions/status-table/?cid=98 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
34. See Memorandum from Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Professor Linda Silberman to the Council
of the Am. L. Inst. (Nov. 30, 1998), https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/ed/f9/edf92d0f-e280-4480-b8de5aade127c56c/foreign-judgments-memorandum.pdf.
35. See Lance Liebman, Foreword to AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE, at xii–xiii (2005).
36. See id. at xi–xii.
37. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial
Matters, July 2, 2019, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/806e290e-bbd8-413d-b15e-8e3e1bf1496d.pdf.
38. See id. at art. 5 (jurisdictional bases), art. 6 (in rem exclusion), art. 7 (defenses), art. 12 (authentication).
39. See id. at art. 13.
40. See id. at art. 15.
41. See Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/
status-table/?cid=137 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
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and if ratified, it is not clear what reservations might be imposed. Assuming it is
ratified in the United States and the implementing statute does not impose
additional requirements on enforcing states (that would create a federal
enforcement law), then the Convention appears to be compatible with both
current recognition and enforcement methods, including common law, the 1962
Act, the 2005 Act, and (if enacted by states) the 2019 Canadian Judgment
Registration Act.
B. CANADIAN APPROACHES TO FOREIGN-COUNTRY JUDGMENTS
This review of Canadian law is brief because this Article is about judgment
enforcement in the United States. The discussion here involves Canadian
jurisdictions only to the extent of harmonizing United States practice, at least in
the twenty-six states using the 2005 Act, and hopefully in newly-adopting states.
Interestingly, Canadian law on foreign-country judgment enforcement is more
complex than in the United States because Canada has not only the same internal
border issues, but has also managed to tie into specific treaties with the United
Kingdom42 and France,43 and has other federal legislation geared to judgmentenforcement treaties.44 A full summation of the larger Canadian law on foreignjudgment enforcement would take several pages and is unnecessary in this
Article about a new act for adoption in the United States. The discussion below
is limited to Canada’s uniform provincial laws directed to foreign-country
judgment enforcement.
1. Common Law
Canada’s foreign-judgment enforcement system evolved from common
law enforcement which prevailed until statutory procedures emerged in the
twentieth century. As with the doctrinal struggle in the United States, Canadian
law on foreign-judgment enforcement vacillated between a preclusion-based
system and a sovereignty-based comity approach that included reciprocity. The
leading Canadian treatise on the subject explains the theoretical contrast between
the common law and typical civil law systems: common law enforcement tends
to be on a case-by-case basis, while many non-common law countries either do

42. See Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Can.-U.K., Apr. 24, 1984, 1987 Can. T.S. No. 29 (enacted as the Canada-United
Kingdom Civil and Commercial Judgments Convention Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-30); see also JEAN-GABRIEL
CASTEL & JANET WALKER, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14.27 (LexisNexis Can. Inc. 6th ed. 2005).
43. See Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the French Republic on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Maintenance, Can.-Fr., June 10, 1996, https://www.ulcc.ca/en/annual-meetings/377-1997whitehorse-yk/civil-section-documents/1132-convention-between-government-of-canada-and-government-offrench-republic-1997?showall=1&limitstart=. For an example of adoption in a Canadian province, see The
Enforcement of Judgments Convention and Consequential Amendments Act, C.C.S.M. c E117 (Can. Man.). See
also CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.28.
44. See CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.29 (discussing Canadian federal statutes directed to
foreign and international judgments regarding antitrust, foreign trade, oil pollution, and terrorism victims).
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not recognize foreign judgments at all (requiring re-litigation) or recognize
judgments from specific reciprocating countries, subject to a few objections.45
This resembles the contrasting views in the United States as shown in the Hilton
majority and dissent, and the Hilton dissent’s echo in Johnston.46
Like jurisdictions in the United States, the results in Canada have been a
hybrid. The two Canadian statutory-enforcement systems—the REJA-C and the
UEFJA-C—are based on the common law but differ in their procedures, and
common law enforcement remains available as an alternative to registration or
recognition under one of the standardized Canadian acts.47
2. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (REJA-C)
Statutory procedures began to replace common law enforcement in the
early twentieth century. The REJA-C, though originally derived from a 1924
model law, is now a collection of statutes with varying content48 used in most
Canadian provinces and territories—all but Quebec and Saskatchewan.49 The
adopted versions are not uniform in sections, wording, or scope.50 According to
Professor Janet Walker, the REJA-C was originally intended as a catch-all act
to provide a registration procedure for civil money judgments from reciprocating
jurisdictions—both Canadian and foreign.51 This is consistent, for example, with
Alberta’s REJA-C. 52
The adopted versions in various provinces and territories have naturally
mutated over the many years, and now New Brunswick applies its REJA-C only
to foreign-country judgments,53 using other statutes to enforce other Canadian
judgments. Ontario applies its REJA-C only to Canadian provinces and
territories,54 presumably leaving judgment creditors from foreign countries to
use common law enforcement. There are, however, three common features
among all REJA-C versions: a convenient registration procedure, the option to
use common law recognition/enforcement, and a stiff reciprocity requirement.
45. See id. § 14.1.
46. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 180–95 (1895); Johnson v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
242 N.Y. 381, 385 (1926).
47. See generally CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, ch.14.
48. See id. § 14.24 & n.1.
49. Ten Canadian jurisdictions have enacted a version of the REJA-C, labeled as such: Reciprocal
Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.A. 2000, c R-6 (Can. Alta.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act,
R.S.M. 1987, c J20 (Can. Man.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. 2014, c 127 (Can. N.B.);
An Act to Facilitate the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments, R.S.N. 1990, c R-4 (Can. Nfld.); Reciprocal
Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c R-1 (Can. N.W.T., Nun.); An Act Respecting the Reciprocal
Enforcement of Judgments, R.S.N.S. 1989, c 388 (Can. N.S.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgements Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c R.5 (Can. Ont.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c R-6 (Can. P.E.I.);
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c 189 (Can. Yukon).
50. As with uniform acts in the United States, various differences exist between the Canadian jurisdictions’
REJA-C adoptions. See CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.24.
51. See id.
52. See Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.A. 2000, c R-6, § 1 (Can. Alta.); Reciprocating
Jurisdictions Regulation, Alta. Reg. 344/1985, § 1 (Can. Alta.).
53. See Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. 2014, c 127, §§ 1, 3 (Can. N.B.).
54. See id. § 1; see also Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, Ont. Reg. 322/92, § 1 (Can. Ont.).
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The REJA-C is an improvement over the common law with its option for
registering the foreign judgment instead of having to file a new action and
endure a summary proceeding.55 The disadvantage is the element of reciprocity,
and not just the requirement, but the overlay of an administrative process. Under
the REJA-C, reciprocity is not a question to be determined ad hoc by the
enforcing court, but instead requires an administrative process in which the
province’s Lieutenant Governor declares the rendering jurisdiction to be a
reciprocating jurisdiction.56 Once a U.S. state is designated on a province’s
reciprocating list, future judgment creditors can benefit, but the list of approved
U.S. states is small. Alberta, for example, has recognized only Arizona, Idaho,
Montana, and Washington as eligible reciprocating states.57 The process of
having the rendering state placed on the reciprocating list is sufficiently difficult
that many judgment creditors choose the common law recognition, although
there is no available data to assess how many there are in each province. There
is evidence, though, of frustration with the process. Some judgment creditors
have tried to circumvent the reciprocity requirement by first filing in a
reciprocating province and then seeking intra-Canadian enforcement. The
REJA-C anticipates this and prohibits the practice. That is, the original rendering
court must be from a jurisdiction officially recognized as reciprocating.58
One common feature in the various REJA-Cs is the option of foregoing
registration (and cumbersome reciprocity) and filing a new action. As with the
1962 Act and the 2005 Act in the United States, the new action is directed to the
foreign-country judgment rather than the underlying claim and anticipates
summary resolution based on preclusion.59
Two Canadian jurisdictions have not adopted the REJA-C. Quebec—a civil
code jurisdiction—has drafted code provisions60 based on the 1971 Hague
Judgments Convention.61 The Quebec code does not impose reciprocity but also
has no registration option.62 Saskatchewan has adopted the latest version of
Canada’s Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, which offers a
registration procedure, lacks reciprocity, and is discussed immediately below.
55. Professor Walker notes that the REJA-C registration process “is more efficient than the common law
method of enforcement but it can still be cumbersome and expensive.” CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42,
§ 14.24, at 14-103.
56. See, e.g., Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.A. 2000, c R-6, § 8 (Can. Alta.); see also
CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.24 & nn.4–5. In contrast, states in the United States using reciprocity
treat it as a judicial question and some states make it discretionary. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 36A.004(c)(9) (2019).
57. See Reciprocating Jurisdictions Regulation, Alta. Reg. 344/1985, § 1 (Can. Alta.).
58. See CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.24 & n.5.
59. See id. § 14.24 & n.3.
60. See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, arts. 3155–68 (Can.); Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q.
2014, c 1, arts. 507–08 (Can.).
61. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=78;
CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.13 & n.3. The 1971 Hague Judgments Convention (ratified only by
Albania, Cypress, Kuwait, the Netherlands, and Portugal), not to be confused with the 2019 Hague Judgments
Convention, just opened for signature.
62. See CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.3 & n.51.
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3. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA-C)
The Uniform Law Conference of Canada has long encouraged a
reciprocity-free procedure for foreign-country judgments. The original model
came out in 1933 with the Model Foreign Judgments Act, which has been
revised many times since.63 The earliest versions dropped the reciprocity
requirement with its cumbersome administrative layer64 but until recently the
UEFJA-C did not have a registration option like the REJA-C. The Uniform Law
Conference of Canada (ULC-C) produced the most recent version in 2003 and
Saskatchewan enacted it in 2005.65 New Brunswick has enacted, in addition to
its REJA-C, what appears to be a prior version of the UEFJA-C entitled the
Foreign Judgments Act. The New Brunswick version does not require
reciprocity but lacks a registration procedure and instead requires a new action
on the foreign judgment,66 which makes it simply a codification of the common
law similar to the 2005 Act in the United States.
The UEFJA-C is a well-structured Act that offers cost-and-time reduction
while retaining due process concerns. While the REJA-C applies (with some
exceptions) to judgments rendered outside the enforcing forum, including other
Canadian jurisdictions,67 the UEFJA-C is limited to judgments from “foreign
States,” not referring to other Canadian provinces or territories.68 A line-item
comparison with the REJA-C is not practical because the REJA-C lacks a current
model-law format and its ten adoptions vary significantly. A few general
comparisons are possible, though. Compared to the general format for the
various REJA-Cs, the UEFJA-C has more definitions,69 a more tightly defined
scope with additional exclusions,70 a different limitations rule,71 a clearer default
judgment rule,72 discretion to enforce non-monetary judgments,73 an option for
partial enforcement if parts of the foreign judgment exceed the Act’s scope,74
more defenses for the judgment debtor,75 a more nuanced burden of proof,76
precise judgment interest rules,77 and a clearer rule for monetary conversion.78
Like the REJA-C, the UEFJA-C is structured around a registration process, and
63. See id. § 14.23 & n.1.
64. Compare id. § 14.23, with id. § 14.24.
65. The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.S. 2005, c E-9.121 (Sask. Can.).
66. Although the New Brunswick Foreign Judgments Act does not expressly authorize an action on a
foreign judgment, its only function is to regulate such an action. See Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. 2011, c
162, §§ 5–6, 8 (N.B. Can.).
67. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
68. See Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act § 2 (Unif. L. Conf. Can. 2003) (Can.) (defining
“foreign judgment”).
69. See id. § 2 (providing eight definitions).
70. See id. § 3.
71. See id. § 5.
72. See id. §§ 4(d), 9.
73. See id. § 7.
74. See id. §§ 6, 12.
75. See id. §§ 4, 10.
76. See id. § 10.
77. See id. § 15.
78. See id. § 13.
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unlike the REJA-C, the UEFJA-C not only abandons the cumbersome
administrative process regarding the reciprocity list with the Lieutenant
Governor, but abandons the reciprocity element entirely. The UEFJA-C is one
of this Article’s three focus acts and its details are outlined in the chart below.79
C. THE CANADIAN-U.S. PROJECT TO EXPEDITE CIVIL MONEY JUDGMENT
ENFORCEMENT
Vibrant economies benefit from predictable and consistent judgment
enforcement regimes. This was true when the drafters included the full faith and
credit clause in the United States Constitution, and it remains true in the twentyfirst century. On the other hand, judgment enforcement is also a local matter
because of its in rem nature—an action against necessarily local assets. Those
local interests explain why foreign-country judgment enforcement resists
standardization. In a federalist system like the United States or even in more
traditional polities, local customs and policies evolve both judicially and
legislatively to accommodate those competing national and local interests.
Finding the balance between them is essential.
The only universally agreed-upon point in transnational judgment
enforcement is that the rendering forum must have jurisdiction over the
defendant/judgment debtor.80 For interstate judgment enforcement in the United
States, the full faith and credit clause resolved recognition disparities and
compelled common law enforcement through summary actions. Building on
that, the Uniform Law Commission’s UEFJA increased sister-state enforcement
efficiency by replacing the summary legal action with a registration system.81
Judgments from foreign countries are a different matter because of inherent
distrust of foreign legal systems. But arguments against greater efficiencies—
such as registration—fade for judgments from countries with similar legal
traditions. Canada and the United States are ideal matches, and at its January
2017 meeting, the Uniform Law Commission approved a joint project with the
Uniform Law Conference of Canada to draft an act harmonizing the 2005 Act
and the UEJFA-C.82 The stated goal was a registration procedure for United
States jurisdictions that would match that in Canada and create a more efficient
79. See infra Part II.A.
80. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 471 (3d ed. 2005)
(citing, inter alia, ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN J UDGMENTS WORLDWIDE (C. Platto & W.G. Horton eds., 2d ed.
1993)). Even with United States jurisdictions using the 2005 Act, the approach varies. Although the 2005 Act
calls for the filing of a new legal action in the enforcing state, some states routinely allow registration. See, e.g.,
CE Design Ltd. v. HealthCraft Prods., Inc., 79 N.E.3d 325, 329–30 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). In other states requiring
a recognition action, courts sometimes allow registration anyway. See, e.g., Hyundai Sec. Co. v. Lee, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 678, 682–84 (Ct. App. 2013). Nonetheless, judgment registration has not taken hold with foreigncountry judgments.
81. See, for example, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003 (2019), the Texas version of the 1964
Act. Cross border judgment recognition is controversial enough that even sister-state judgment enforcement was
not always efficient or consistent. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
82. See Unif. L. Comm’n, Minutes: Midyear Meeting of the Executive Committee 7 (Jan. 14, 2017),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=2164ce2
7-3552-7548-25a2-457abf438c12.
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domestication of civil money judgments between the two countries.83 The joint
drafting committee had its first meeting in October 2017, and two years later
presented its proposed final act at the 2019 Annual Meeting in Anchorage,
Alaska. On July 17, 2019, the Uniform Law Commission approved the Uniform
Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act and forwarded it to the states
for enactment.84

II. THE UNIFORM REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN JUDGMENTS ACT
The 2019 Registration Act’s purpose is to harmonize the 2005 Act with the
UEFJA-C for civil money judgment enforcement in the adopting jurisdictions in
Canada and the United States. Because the 2019 Registration Act is a drop-in
amendment to the 2005 Act, there is a fair bit of necessary parallel in the two
U.S. Acts. But to accomplish the harmonization between U.S. and Canadian law,
the 2019 Registration Act varies from the 2005 Act on key points. The chart
below lists the similarities and distinctions in the three acts. The summaries’
points here are paraphrased and the full text, without comments, is attached as
Appendix B. The 2019 Registration Act’s text with comments is available on
the Uniform Law Commission website.85
A. THREE ACTS COMPARED
Following is a side-by-side comparison of the 2005 Act, the UEFJA-C, and
the 2019 Registration Act. The 2019 Registration Act is intended to harmonize
the 2005 Act and the UEFJA-C.

83. See id.
84. See Unif. L. Comm’n, Transcript of the Proceedings, 2019 Annual Meeting of the Uniform Law
Commission, Tenth Session, Wednesday, July 17, 2019, at 302–10 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2019) (on file with
author and Unif. L. Cmm’n).
85. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).
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2005 Act
(U.S.)

UEFJA
(Canada)

115

2019 Reg Act
(U.S.)

Basic Provisions
1

Definitions

§ 2 Terms defined:
foreign country
foreign-country
judgment

2

Scope/
Applicability

§ 3(a) limits scope to
foreign-country
judgments to the extent
they (1) grant or deny
recovery for a sum of
money, and (2) are final,
conclusive and
enforceable under the
law of the rendering
state. § 3(b) excludes:
tax judgments
fines or penalties
domestic relations

3

Application
to default
judgments

4

Nonmonetary
awards

Applies to default
judgments without
expressly so stating.
§ 4(c)(6) provides a
discretionary nonrecognition ground for
judgments based only on
personal jurisdiction
which includes, but is
not necessarily limited
to, defaults. The
judgment debtor may
object if notice in the
rendering state was not
made in sufficient time
to prepare a defense. See
§ 4 comment 7.
No. Limited by its terms
to money judgments.

5

Partial

Yes. § 3 provides that

§ 2 Terms defined:
civil proceeding
enforcing court
foreign civil
protection order
foreign judgment
judgment creditor
judgment debtor
registration
state of origin
Applies to foreign
judgments as defined
in § 2. § 3 excludes:
tax judgments
bankruptcy/insolvency
maintenance/
support judgments
recognizing a
judgment from
another foreign
country fines or
penalties judgments
predating this Act
§ 3.1 covers foreign
civil protection orders.
§ 6.1(3)—money
damages includes an
award by rendering
court of costs/
expenses of litigation
Yes. § 4(d) excludes
only default
judgments where
notice was not
received in sufficient
time to present a
defense. § 9 adds a
jurisdictional nexus
(real and substantial
connection)
requirement for
default judgments
(burden of proof on
judgment debtor
(§ 10)).

§ 2 Terms defined:
Canada
Canadian judgment
Consistent with the
2005 Act’s limited
definitions

Yes. § 7 gives the
enforcing court
discretion to enforce a
non-monetary award
and modify it if
necessary.

No, consistent with the
2005 Act’s limit to
money judgments.

Yes. § 6(1) provides a

Yes. § 3(c) expressly

§ 3(a) incorporates the
2005 Act’s scope
because the
Registration Act is a
drop-in for the 2005
Act. However, § 2(2)
tracks the UEJFA-C by
barring chain
registration/recognition
(for example, it limits
judgments to those
litigated in Canada).
Comment 1 to § 3
discusses the
Registration Act’s
position on bankruptcy
but is unchanged from
the 2005 Act.
Applies to default
judgments without
expressly so stating,
consistent with the
2005 Act.
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the Act applies to a
foreign-country
judgment to the extent
it’s within the Act’s
scope and does not
apply to the extent it
falls within an excluded
category. The enforcing
court is free to recognize
and enforce the out-ofscope aspects under
common law or comity.
See § 3 comments 2 &
5.

court can reduce
award for punitive
damages, etc., to the
extent they would be
available in enforcing
state. § 6(2) provides a
court may reduce
excessive actual
damages, limiting to
what the enforcing
court could award.
§ 12(2) provides a
judgment creditor may
register only part of
foreign judgment.
§ 12(4)(c) provides a
creditor may seek
amendment to render
enforceable.

allows partial
registration.

Yes. § 4, and to some
extent, the entire Act is
about the use of
registration as a dropin alternative to the
2005 Act.
No, but § 9 allows the
alternative of filing a
recognition action
under the 2005 Act.

Filing
6

Registration
option

No. Judgment creditors
must file a new lawsuit
or raised by
counterclaim,
crossclaim, etc. See § 6.

Yes. § 12.

7

Recognition
option

Yes. § 11 provides for
recognition for
preclusion purposes
under the same terms
for enforcement.

8

Litigation
option

Yes. § 7(1) provides for
recognition for
preclusion purposes and
§ 7(2) provides for
enforcement as a local
judgment.
Yes, exclusive process,
and § 11 preserves the
common law action.

9

Certification
requirement

10

Translation

Yes. § 12(4)(a)
requires a copy of the
foreign judgment
certified by proper
officer of the
rendering court.
Yes. § 12(4)(d).

11

Notice of
filing in
enforcing
state

No express provision.
Enforcing state’s
evidentiary laws on
authentication govern,
which may in turn look
to rendering state’s law.
No express provision;
presumably governed by
enforcing state’s law.
No express provision.
But § 6 (which requires
the filing of a new
action) would require
notice under enforcing
state’s law.

§ 12(3) requires notice
to judgment debtor of
intent to register the
foreign judgment.

Yes. § 6 requires
notice of registration in
the same manner as
notice of a new claim.

12

Limitations
period

§ 9 provides the earlier
of (1) time allowed by

§ 5 provides the
earlier of (1) time

No change from the
2005 Act. See § 7.

No express provision.
But contract with § 3.1
allowing judgment
creditor to proceed
under another Act
(UECJDA).

No, but § 9 allows
filing a recognition
action under the 2005
Act. As a result, the
Registration Act can
only be used for
enforcement and not
preclusion purposes.
Yes. § 4(b)(1) is based
on the UEFJA-C
§ 12(4)(a).

Yes. § 4(b)(10).
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rendering state, or (2) 15
years after date the
judgment became
effective in the
rendering state.

13

Act defines
enforcing
court

No express provision;
presumably must be
filed in a court having
subject matter
jurisdiction. See § 6.

allowed by rendering
state, or (2) 10 years
after date the
judgment became
enforceable in the
rendering state.
Yes. § 2 provides “the
superior court of
unlimited trial
jurisdiction in the
enacting province or
territory.”

117

No change from the
2005 Act. See § 4(a).

Defenses
14

Defenses to
registration/
recognition/
enforcement

§ 4 provides two-tiers of
defenses: mandatory and
discretionary. § 4(b) is
mandatory and bars
recognition for lack of:
impartial tribunal or
reasonable procedural
opportunities (must be
systemic), personal
jurisdiction, and subject
matter jurisdiction.
§ 4(c) provides
discretionary nonrecognition for: lack of
notice in time to prepare
a defense extrinsic fraud
public policy conflict
with a final and
conclusive judgment
conflict with a forum
clause derogating from
the rendering forum’s
jurisdiction inconvenient
forum (for judgments
based only on personal
jurisdiction) substantial
doubts about rendering
court’s integrity due
process. § 5 defines nonexclusive bases for
personal jurisdiction:
personal service in the
rendering forum
(including transient
jurisdiction), voluntary
appearance, consent
prior to case
commencement,
human domicile, or
corporate presence
(incorporation/formation
or principal place of
business) in the
rendering state business
presence in the
rendering forum related

§ 4 provides a foreign
judgment cannot be
enforced if the:
rendering court lacked
personal or subject
matter jurisdiction as
defined in § 8 & § 9
judgment has been
satisfied judgment is
unenforceable in the
rendering state, or
appeal is pending, or
time for appeal
expired not properly
served under the
rendering state’s law,
or did not receive
notice in sufficient
time to present a
defense, and the
judgment was allowed
by default judgment
was obtained by fraud
lack of procedural
fairness and natural
justice in the rendering
state judgment is
manifestly contrary to
the enforcing state’s
public policy a parallel
case in the enforcing
state that began before
the case seeking
enforcement, or has
resulted in another
judgment or order in
the enforcing state, or
has been reduced to
judgment in foreign
state other than the
rendering state. § 10
states a foreign
judgment may not be
enforced if the
judgment debtor
shows a lack of real

No change from the
2005 Act. See § 7. The
2019 Act incorporates
by reference all
defensive grounds in
the 2005 Act. See
§ 7(b) and comment 2.
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Burden

16

Stay
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to the judgment vehicle/
aircraft operation in the
rendering forum related
to the judgment. In
addition to defenses in
§ 4 & § 5, there are
other primary defenses
such as falling outside
the Act’s scope.
§ 3(c) places the burden
on the party seeking
recognition to file a new
lawsuit and obtain a
local judgment based on
preclusion. Once filed,
§ 4(d) places a burden of
raising and proving
defenses on the
judgment debtor.

and substantial
connection with the
rendering state AND
that jurisdiction was
inappropriate there.

§ 10 places the burden
on judgment debtor to
establish the defenses of
lack of real/ substantial
connection,
inappropriate
jurisdiction. Other
defense sections, § 4
(reasons for refusal), § 8
(personal jurisdiction),
§ 9 (real and substantial
connection) do not
specify.

§ 7. Once an
authenticated foreign
judgment is registered
under § 4 and notice
given under § 5, the
burden is on the
judgment debtor to
establish a defense
under § 7. Failing that,
the registration results
in a local judgment
capable of
enforcement.

Yes. § 8 places the
burden on the judgment
debtor to show the case
is on appeal or that one
will be taken; the court
may issue a stay until
the appeal concludes,
time for appeal expires,
or defendant has failed
to prosecute the appeal.

§ 4(c) provides a
defense to
enforcement if on
appeal, or time for
filing appeal has not
run.

Yes. § 8 provides that
after filing a § 7
petition to set aside the
registration, a party
may request a stay
which can be granted
upon a showing of
likelihood of success
on the merits. The
court may require
security.

There is no registration
procedure. The judgment
creditor files a new
lawsuit, gives notice to
the judgment debtor, then
moves for summary
judgment unless the
judgment debtor pleads a
defense. If judgment
creditor prevails, the
foreign judgment is
domesticated and
enforceable locally.
§ 7(2) provides
enforcement as local
judgment after
recognition which
requires summary
judgment or trial.

The filing of a
properly attested
foreign judgment
leads to registration,
notice to the judgment
debtor, and
enforcement under the
enforcing
jurisdiction’s law
unless the judgment
debtor successfully
raises a defense.

Same as the UEFJA-C.
The filing of a properly
attested foreign
judgment leads to
registration, notice to
the judgment debtor,
and enforcement under
the enforcing forum’s
law unless the
judgment debtor
successfully raises a
defense.

§ 14 provides
registered judgment is
enforceable 30 days
after filing as if it were
local judgment so long
as no successful
defenses.
Yes. Under § 12(5), a
judgment creditor
may, if the regulations
provide, recover the

§ 7 provides the same
result as under the
UEFJA-C.

Outcome
17

Effect of
filing

18

Enforcement

19

Costs

No express provision;
presumably governed by
enforcing state’s law.

Yes. § 4(b)(6)(B)
requires listing of
Canadian costs.
§ 4(b)(7) requires listing
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costs and expenses
related to the
registration of the
foreign judgment.

20

Interest

No express provision;
presumably governed by
enforcing state’s law.

Yes. § 15 is governed
by the rendering
state’s law up to date
of currency
conversion and
thereafter by the
enforcing state’s law.
Court has discretion to
change the rate or
calculation
methodology if the
judgment creditor
would be under- or
over-compensated.

21

Currency
conversion

No express provision;
presumably governed by
the enforcing state’s
law.

Yes. § 13 requires
judgment creditor’s
statement that the
judgment will be
converted to local
currency on the
conversion date; the
conversion date is the
last day, before the
day on which the
judgment debtor
makes a payment to
the judgment creditor
under the registered
foreign judgment, on
which the bank quotes
a Canadian dollar
equivalent to the other
currency.

119
of post-judgment costs
up to the date of
registration; no mention
of enforcing state costs,
presumably governed by
enforcing state’s law.
§ 4(b)(6)(A) requires
listing in the
registration the rate
and accrual of interest
awarded by the
rendering court; does
not mention the cutoff
date when Canadian
law no longer governs,
or the effect of the
Canadian rate on the
resulting enforcing
state’s judgment.
No mention, same as
2005 Act. See § 4
Comment 11, which
notes the intent to track
the 2005 Act on this
point.

As the chart shows, the 2019 Registration Act follows its parent Act—the
2005 Act—on such fundamental points as definitions, scope, defenses, and
several of the issues left to the enforcing state’s law. On the other hand, the
Registration Act accomplishes its harmonization task with key sections on the
filing procedure (registration rather than a new legal action), notice, the
expedited effect, changes in the stay provision, the petition to set aside, and the
provisional remedies available upon registration.
B. A DRY RUN THROUGH REGISTERING AND OBJECTING
The chart above and this brief synopsis are paraphrases of the Act’s
elements. For a thorough understanding of the 2019 Registration Act, read its
text in Appendix B or better still, read the Act and comments at the Uniform
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Law Commission website.86 The few case citations in this Subpart are of course
for enforcement under the 2005 Act or the 1962 Act, and not the 2019
Registration Act which is just now being sent to the states.
1. Filing
a. Compliance
Although some cases hold that substantial compliance with filing
requirements is enough,87 certain elements are no doubt necessary for any court.
One is a copy of the foreign-country judgment authenticated by the rendering
court.88 As to other requirements, the 2019 Registration Act includes a form as
an appendix to Section 4.89 The form is not required when filing, but its use
makes acceptance more likely in states adopting the 2019 Act substantially
intact.
b. Who May File
The named judgment creditor of course may file. The 2019 Act also
contemplates that the judgment creditor’s assignees or successors may file.90
What about the judgment creditor’s status in the enforcing state? In a New York
case under the 1962 Act, a judgment debtor objected that the judgment creditor
was neither present in nor registered to do business in the enforcing state. The
court held that the state’s corporate registration requirement did not apply to
parties using the court to enforce a foreign judgment.91
c. No Chain Recognition
A judgment creditor may not use the 2019 Registration Act to register a
Canadian judgment that merely recognized or domesticated another judgment.92
The Canadian judgment must be original, one that was litigated in the rendering
court. This is consistent with the UEFJA-C and the drafting committee thought
it essential for harmonization.93

86. See id.; see also id., Prefatory Note at 4–5.
87. See Frymer v. Brettschneider, 696 So. 2d 1266, 1267–68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (decided under
1962 Act).
88. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(1); see also Ningbo FTZ
Sanbang Indus. Co. v. Frost Nat’l Bank, 338 F. App’x 415, 417 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding district court’s
dismissal for failure to state a claim because the judgment creditor did not produce an authenticated copy of the
Chinese judgment) (decided under 1962 Act).
89. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(d).
90. See id. § 4(b)(3).
91. See Gemstar Can., Inc. v. George A. Fuller Co., 6 N.Y.S.3d 552, 554 (App. Div. 2015) (decided under
1962 Act).
92. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 2(2).
93. See Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act §3(d) (Unif. L. Conf. Can. 2003) (Can.).
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d. What to Seek
Judgment creditors are limited to the monetary amount stated in the
rendering court’s final judgment, minus payments, plus allowable costs.94
Currency conversion is not addressed in the 2019 Registration Act but is
mentioned in a comment, which notes that conversion will be handled under the
enforcing state’s law, as in the 2005 Act.95 What if there is a delay because of
appeal in the rendering forum, and the converted amount changes because of
drastic currency fluctuations? There are no cases on point, but it is likely that
any change other than appropriate conversion would amount to re-litigation and
therefore be inappropriate.96
e. Limitations
The 2019 Registration Act defers to the 2005 Act for filing limitations.97
The 2005 Act requires that the judgment be filed within the earlier of the time
during which the foreign-country judgment is effective in the foreign country or
fifteen years from the date that the foreign-country judgment became effective
in the foreign country.98 The limitations rule in the 2005 Act (and incorporated
into the 2019 Registration Act) applies to the filing period in the enforcing state.
Any issue of limitations in the rendering forum would have to be raised there
and cannot be relitigated in the enforcing forum.99
f. Alternate Procedures
Section 9 of the 2019 Registration Act gives judgment creditors the option
of registering an appropriate Canadian judgment, or seeking recognition under
the 2005 Act by filing a legal action.100 Either is available, but not both.101 For
judgments (or portions of judgments) not within the 2019 Registration Act’s
scope, judgment creditors may seek recognition under another recognition
statute or the common law.102
2. Notice
The 2019 Registration Act has a detailed notice provision. This differs from
the 2005 Act, which has no notice provision but instead requires the filing of a
new recognition action under the enforcing state’s law, which implicitly requires

94. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(6)–(8).
95. See id. § 4 cmt. 11.
96. See Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic, 881 F.3d 213, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (filing a petition to enforce
arbitration rather than an action under the 1962 or 2005 Acts; holding that the award had to be converted under
current exchange rates and any other approach was relitigation).
97. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 7(b)(1); id. cmt. 3.
98. See UNIF. FOREIGN -COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 9 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005).
99. See Manco Contracting Co. (W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian, 195 P.3d 604, 612–16 (Cal. 2008) (explaining the
functions of the limitations period in the rendering forum and the enforcing forum).
100. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 9(b).
101. See id. § 9(c).
102. See id. § 9 cmt. 5.
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use of the enforcing state’s notice rules.103 Because the 2019 Act speeds up
enforcement unless objections are raised, the notice requirements are crucial,
and the 2019 Act specifies both the manner of service and the notice’s content.
a. Manner of Service
The 2019 Act requires the registering party to “cause notice of registration
to be served on the person against whom the judgment has been registered.”104
The notice must be served in the same manner as a summons and complaint is
served under the enforcing state’s version of the 2005 Act.105
b. Content
The notice of registration must include (paraphrased here): (1) the
registration date and court identity; (2) the docket number; (3) the registering
person’s name and address (and attorney, if any); (4) a copy of the registration
including the documents required under Section 4(b); and (5) a statement
advising the person against whom the judgment was registered that they have
thirty days to petition the court with objections, and that the court may shorten
or lengthen the thirty-day period.106
After service, the judgment debtor (or person against whom the judgment
is registered) has thirty days to file objections or seek a stay. Failing that, the
Canadian judgment becomes domesticated and immediately enforceable. This is
a crucial distinction from the 2005 Act where the judgment debtor has not only
answer time, but the additional time required for a summary proceeding.
Because of notice’s link to the thirty-day period and domestication, it is likely
that enforcing courts will strictly observe the details required in 2019 Act notice.
3. The Thirty-Day Grace Period and Provisional Remedies
Under Section 5 of the 2019 Registration Act, successful notice filed with
the clerk triggers a thirty-day grace period during which the judgment “may not
be enforced by sale or other property disposition of property, or by seizure of
property or garnishment.”107 The thirty-day imposed period is another
distinction from the 2005 Act which has implicit non-enforcement periods
(answer time, summary judgment procedure, possibly discovery) during the
required summary proceeding. The thirty-day period may be shortened or
extended.108 During the grace period, the judgment creditor may use provisional

103. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY J UDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6 (requiring the filing of a
new action); id. cmt. 4.
104. UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 6(a).
105. Id. § 6(b). If the enforcing state has amended its 2005 Act to add a notice section, that section controls.
If not, then the enforcing state’s basic notice law controls. See id.
106. See id. § 6(c).
107. See id. § 5(b).
108. See id.
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remedies, such as judgment liens or injunction (to the extent available under
local law), to prevent asset dissipation.109
4. The Judgment Debtor’s Defenses
The 2019 Registration Act incorporates the defenses from the 2005 Act.110
In 2005 Act lawsuits, the defenses are raised in an Answer or Motion to Dismiss.
If the judgment debtor fails to object, the judgment creditor must file a summary
judgment motion or seek another resolution to obtain judgment. This more
structured procedure changes with the 2019 Registration Act, where the
Canadian judgment is registered and becomes final and domesticated as a matter
of course in thirty days if the judgment debtor fails to raise objections as outlined
below. There is no need for summary resolution. The enforcing court’s only
function is to ensure that proper registration procedure is followed, to resolve
any interlocutory motions, and to adjudicate any defenses. If there are no
defenses, enforcement follows.
a. The Petition to Vacate Registration
The judgment debtor may invoke defenses by filing a Petition to Vacate
Registration within thirty days of receiving notice.111 For enforcement under the
2005 Act, these defenses would have been raised in an Answer or Motion to
Vacate, or dismissal for failure to state a claim in federal court.112 The defenses
are limited to the grounds stated in the 2005 Act, or noncompliance with the
filing requirements in the 2019 Registration Act.113
b. Defenses to Registration
The 2005 Act provides three mandatory and eight discretionary dismissal
grounds, recited here because they apply to the 2019 Registration Act. The
mandatory and discretionary dismissal grounds are discussed further below as
indicated in the footnotes. The mandatory rejection grounds are that the
rendering forum (1) was part of a judicial system “that does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of
law;”114 (2) lacked personal jurisdiction;115 or (3) lacked subject matter

109. See id. § 5(b); id. cmt. 3.
110. See id. § 7(b)(1).
111. See id. § 7(a). The term “petition” is bracketed and may be replaced in adopting states by “motion” or
other appropriate term. See id.
112. Federal courts can get picky about the defense procedure used under the 2005 Act. See DeJoria v.
Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 935 F.3d 381, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2019) (admonishing the judgment debtor for
using a “motion for nonrecognition” instead of summary judgment or a bench trial). But see LMS Commodities
DMCC v. Libyan Foreign Bank, No. 1:18-CV-679-RP, 2019 WL 1925499, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2019)
(dismissing the filing of a non-final judgment and using Federal Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim)).
113. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 7(b)(1)–(2).
114. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(1) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005), discussed infra
Part III.C.1.
115. Id. § 4(b)(2), discussed infra Part III.B.1(a).
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jurisdiction.116 The eight discretionary grounds are: (1) lack of notice in time to
prepare a defense in the rendering court;117 (2) extrinsic fraud;118 (3) the
judgment or claim is repugnant to the enforcing courts or U.S. public policy;119
(4) conflict with another final and conclusive judgment;120 (5) violation of a
mandatory forum clause;121 (6) inconvenient forum (limited to cases with
jurisdiction based only on personal service);122 (7) the rendering court’s lack of
integrity with respect to the judgment;123 or (8) due process violations.124 The
2005 Act also provides other defenses such as being outside the scope125 or
exceeding the limitations period.126 Under the 2019 Registration Act, yet another
defense is noncompliance with registration requirements.127
c. Do Not Lie
In raising these defenses, do not assume that the rendering court’s
remoteness enables you to misrepresent what happened. In Moersch v.
Zahedi,128 the judgment debtor filed an affidavit attesting that he was not served
and did not participate in the Luxembourg trial. The enforcing court found
contrary evidence in the Luxembourg court record. The ease of access to
Canadian court records will make honesty all the more essential under the 2019
Registration Act.
d. Stays
For judgment debtors with grounds to object, the thirty-day grace period
may not be long enough to resolve those objections. Even so, a stay beyond the
thirty-day period is not automatic—the judgment debtor or resisting party must
request it, and must do so within the thirty-day grace period following notice.129
In addition, the stay-seeking party must (1) have filed a Petition to Vacate
Registration and (2) show a likelihood of success on the merits of the objections

116. Id. § 4(b)(3), discussed infra Part III.B.1(b).
117. Id. § 4(c)(1), discussed infra Part III.C.2.
118. Id. § 4(c)(2), discussed infra Part III.C.2.
119. Id. § 4(c)(3), discussed infra Part III.C.2.
120. Id. § 4(c)(4), discussed infra Part III.C.2.
121. Id. § 4(c)(5), discussed infra Part III.C.2.
122. Id. § 4(c)(6), discussed infra Part III.C.2.
123. Id. § 4(c)(7), discussed infra Part III.C.2.
124. See id. § 4(c)(8), discussed infra Part III.C.2.
125. See, e.g., LMS Commodities DMCC v. Libyan Foreign Bank, No. 1:18-CV-679-RP, 2019 WL
1925499, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2019). The judgment creditor sought to enforce Tunisian judgment that was
in fact an asset freeze order and not a final judgment. Id.
126. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 9.
127. Under the 2005 Act, the filing requirements are those governing the filing of a new action under the
enforcing state’s law. See id. § 6. This changes under the 2019 Registration Act where the filing requirements
are the registration provisions in sections 4 and 6. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS
ACT §§ 4, 6 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).
128. Moersch v. Zahedi, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1084–85 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
129. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 8.

November 2020]

MONEY JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT

125

(not the merits originally litigated). The court may require security for the
stay.130
e. Offsets or Counterclaims
The 2019 Registration Act covers only Canadian judgment registration and
does not address offsets or counterclaims. For recognition actions under the 2005
Act, a judgment debtor could assert an opposing claim or offset because the
recognition action is a lawsuit, albeit one seeking summary adjudication. For
that sort of action under the 2005 Act, the opposing claim would have to be
permissive because compulsory (that is, related) claims would be merged with
the final judgment being recognized.131 Even though the permissive claim might
be allowable in a 2005 Act action, it should not be allowed in a 2019 Registration
Act procedure because there is no lawsuit.
f. Relitigating the Merits
It is a widely accepted rule for judgment preclusion and enforcement that
a party cannot relitigate the merits of a properly rendered claim. The
Restatement (Second) of Judgments makes the basic point in regard to
preclusion generally: “No principle of law is more firmly settled than that the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it stands in full force
and is unreversed, cannot be impeached in any collateral proceeding on account
of mere errors or irregularities, not going to the jurisdiction.”132 The Restatement
(Second) of Judgments cites several cases in support, quoting the oldest: “Where
a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which occurs in
the cause; and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, until
reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court.”133 The Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws makes the same point in regard to a judgment’s
extraterritorial effect.134 As a California court recently noted, the judgment
debtor should have raised the issue of damage caps during the Canadian
litigation and may not litigate that issue in the enforcing state, which can look
only to enforcing the rendering jurisdiction’s final judgment.135
130. See id. § 5(b).
131. See Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that compulsory
counterclaims may not be raised in enforcing forum because that amounts to relitigation) (decided under 1962
Act).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17, at 151 (AM. L. INST. 1982) (Reporter’s Note on
comment d) (quoting 1 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 271 (2d ed.
1902)).
133. Id. (quoting Elliott v. Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828)).
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 106 (AM. L. INST. 1971) (explaining that judgment
will be enforced in spite of error of fact or law) (citing MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 52 A. 982 (N.H.
1902) (holding that Canadian judgment for defendant had preclusive effect in plaintiff’s subsequent lawsuit in
the United States)); see also id. § 98 cmt. b (detailing how the rationale is the need for an end to litigation).
135. See Silver Star Alpine Meadows Dev. Ltd. v. Quinlan, No. A145358, 2016 WL 6649201, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2016); see also Batbrothers LLC v. Paushok, 101 N.Y.S.3d 297, 298 (App. Div. 2019)
(decided under 1962 Act); UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 6 cmt. 3 (UNIF. L. CMM’N
2005); UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 7 cmt. 5 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).
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g. Reciprocity
Reciprocity is the concept that the enforcing state will refuse recognition
of a judgment from a foreign country that does not in turn recognize the
enforcing state’s judgments. It was the basis for the holding in Hilton,136 is used
in Canada’s REJA,137 is an element of the American Law Institute proposal,138
and has been incorporated into some states’ adoptions of the 1962 Act or the
2005 Act.139 It is not, however, in the Uniform version of the 1962 Act or the
2005 Act, is not in Canada’s UEFJA-C, and is not in the new 2019 Registration
Act. The drafters of both the 1962 Act and the 2005 Act believed that judgment
enforcement was best served by (1) clarifying the recognition standards and (2)
omitting reciprocity.140 With the 2019 Registration Act, the goal of judgment
facilitation is even further served in aligning with Canada’s UEFJA-C.
Currently, only Saskatchewan has enacted the newest UEFJA-C, and one of the
purposes of the 2019 Registration Act was to assure Canadian jurisdictions of a
more open approach to properly presented judgments. To the extent that states
adopting the 2005 Act have added a reciprocity requirement, it will appear in the
list of defenses as it does with the Texas adoption, and will carry over to
registrations under the 2019 Registration Act. Although that inclusion does not
entirely thwart the 2019 Registration Act’s purpose, it is inconsistent. It will be
best if adopting states reconsider reciprocity in assessing the 2019 Registration
Act.
5. Costs and Attorney Fees
Unlike the 2005 Act, which defers to the enforcing state’s law, the 2019
Registration Act addresses costs and attorney fees in both the rendering forum
and the enforcing forum. When registering the Canadian judgment, the judgment
creditor lists the costs awarded by the rendering court,141 the attorney fees,142
and the post-judgment costs and fees incurred during enforcement up to the point
of registration.143 If only part of the Canadian judgment is being registered, the
judgment creditor must allocate the costs and fees attributable to the registered
portion.144

136. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1004–06 (5th Cir. 1990)
(citing former TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §36.005(b)(7) (2017)) (decided under 1962 Act). In 2017,
Texas adopted the 2005 Act and again included a reciprocity provision. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 36A.004(c)(9) (2019).
140. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT, Prefatory Note at 1 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005).
141. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(6)(B) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).
142. See id. § 4(b)(6)(C).
143. See id. § 4(b)(7).
144. See id. § 4(b)(6), (9).
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6. Appeals
For 2005 Act enforcements, any issue going to the merits of the underlying
claim must be appealed in the rendering jurisdiction.145 Consistently, under the
2019 Registration Act, issues on the merits must be appealed in the rendering
Canadian jurisdiction.146 Appeals in the enforcing jurisdiction are limited for
2005 Act cases to issues regarding the recognition process, including filing,
stays and defenses. Consistently again, appeals under the 2019 Registration Act
are limited to the registration process. Neither the 2005 Act nor the 2019
Registration Act address appeals in the enforcing forum, deferring to the
enforcing state’s law.
As to appeal timing, the 2005 Act appeals are presumably triggered by
entry of final judgment recognizing the foreign-country judgment, or a denial.
Under the 2019 Registration Act, appeals are triggered by the entering of the
domesticated foreign-country judgment, or the vacating of registration.
Presumably for both 2005 and 2019 procedures, the enforcing state’s appeal
timing would run such that the appealing party has, for example, thirty days to
perfect an appeal under the enforcing state’s law.
7. Enforcing the Domesticated Judgment
After the registered Canadian judgment is domesticated in the enforcing
state, it is ready for enforcement under the enforcing state’s laws. It is now a
local judgment subject to all local procedures, including challenges to or appeals
from collection issues.147
8. Relation to the 2005 Act
Section 9 of the 2019 Registration Act explains that it is a supplement to
the 2005 Act, all of which applies to registrations except for the 2005 Act’s
Section 6, which is the requirement of filing a lawsuit in the enforcing state to
obtain recognition.148 Of course, the 2005 Act remains available for Canadian
judgments, so the Canadian judgment creditor has a choice between registering
under the 2019 Registration Act or filing a recognition lawsuit under the 2005
Act’s Section 6.149 Either is available, but not both.150
If the Canadian judgment creditor chooses registration but the court vacates
the registration for noncompliance with registration procedures, then the
judgment creditor again has a choice—file a new registration if the defect is

145. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4 cmt. 12 (noting the need to exhaust
remedies in the rendering forum).
146. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 7–8.
147. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 5 cmt. 1; see also UNIF. FOREIGNCOUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 6 cmt. 4, 7(2) cmt. 3.
148. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 9(a).
149. See id. § 9(b).
150. See id. § 9(c).
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curable,151 or file a recognition action under the 2005 Act’s Section 6.152 If the
enforcing state’s court vacates registration or rules against the judgment creditor
on any grounds other than non-compliance, that result is likely preclusive of
further enforcement attempts, at least in that state and possibly other states.153
C. DEFERRAL TO THE ENFORCING STATE’S LAW
Readers should not infer from the enforcement synopsis above that the
steps provided in the 2019 Registration Act, or the 2005 Act for that matter,
control the overall enforcement process. Both Acts facilitate the process to an
extent (with the 2019 Registration Act limited to Canadian money judgments),
but the enforcing state’s law still determines much of the outcome. Control by
the enforcing state is not limited to its local law—choice of law rules play a
significant role, but the enforcing state controls that analysis.
The role of the enforcing state’s law is best understood by categorizing the
process. The 2019 Registration Act is limited to the registration process that
supplants the lawsuit filing required under the 2005 Act. Beyond registration (or
filing under the 2005 Act), two essential functions remain: (1) the recognition
standards that will govern if the judgment debtor challenges registration with a
Petition to Vacate, and (2) execution on the judgment if there is no challenge, or
if the challenge fails. These functions are included in the dry run synopsis
immediately above but need further explanation.
Recognition standards focus, of course, on the rendering state and include
issues such as jurisdiction and due process. As explained above in the historical
background, the standards are drawn from common law enforcement and were
codified first in the 1962 Act, and again in the 2005 Act, to which the 2019
Registration Act defers.154 Under both the 2005 Act and the 2019 Registration
Act, the standards are presumed met unless the judgment debtor objects and
proves noncompliance on at least one standard.155 The 2005 Act addresses the
recognition standards in some detail but also defers to the enforcing state’s law
on several fundamental issues. One example of detail versus deferral is the
judgment debtor’s amenability to the rendering state. The 2005 Act lists six
examples creating presence-related amenability,156 but then defers to the
enforcing state’s law for other bases of nonresident amenability.157 Due process
is an even broader example of deferral, invoked under two standards but leaving
151. See id. § 9(d)(1).
152. See id. § 9(d)(2).
153. Under the 1962 Act, a Texas appellate court rejected what it termed “back door” enforcement though
prior recognition in Louisiana. See Reading & Bates Const. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702,
715 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding the Canadian judgment under a 2005 Act filing but rejecting the attempt
to enforce the Louisiana recognition under full faith and credit).
154. See Manco Contracting Co. (W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian, 195 P.3d 604, 608 (2008) (citing 13 pt. II West’s
U. Laws Ann. (2002) Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Prefatory Note, p. 40).
155. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 7, discussed supra Part II.B.4.
156. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 5(a) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005); see also infra
note 174 and accompanying text.
157. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 5(b).
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its parameters to the enforcing state’s law.158 As further explained in Part III, the
2005 Act merely sets broad standards on many issues that require definition and
substance from the enforcing state’s law, all applying to cases registered under
the 2019 Registration Act.
Once recognition is accomplished, the now-domesticated judgment is
enforceable. Even so, questions remain. It may seem a truism to point out that
foreign judgments, after domestication, are governed by the enforcing state’s
law. After all, it is no longer foreign but now a local judgment, so local law of
course controls its execution. That simplification misses the complexity of legal
issues and leads to the mistaken assumption that enforcement is routine with no
fundamental differences between enforcing states. To the contrary, the
enforcement phase reveals significant distinctions between states on
fundamental issues such as asset susceptibility, privity, and a host of other
issues. The degree and persistence of these distinctions between states’
procedures shows the intensity of local control exercised over asset execution.
Even if the distinctions are happenstance rather than intentional policy
differences, it is important for parties—both creditors and debtors—to
understand that enforcement measures are distinct from recognition (whether it
is registration or litigation),159 and that distinctions exist between states, both
foreign and domestic. Although the 2019 Registration Act is limited to the
registration process, this discussion would be incomplete if it left off at
registration and ignored the myriad of differing perspectives that follow. They
are discussed below in Part III.

III. THE LARGER JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT SETTING UNDER THE 2005
ACT
As noted immediately above, the two foreign judgment Acts in the United
States—1962 and 2005—leave much to the enforcing state’s law regarding
recognition and everything regarding enforcement. This section addresses some
of the issues, particularly governing law, that may arise when enforcing a
judgment under the 2005 Act or the 2019 Registration Act. It also distinguishes
a few points that differ when using the 2019 Registration Act instead of the 2005
Act for a Canadian judgment. Because the 2005 Act is still being considered for
adoption and has only been used in some states for a few years, most of the cases
cited in this Article were rendered in a state using the 1962 Act, and some were
rendered in a state such as Kansas or Mississippi that uses the common law
enforcement method. Where this Article cites 1962 Act cases, they are identified
with the parenthetical “(decided under 1962 Act)” but they should be valid for
the 2005 Act. On the other hand, whether the enforcing Act was 1962 or 2005,
the law in one state is not necessarily the law in another as illustrated several
times in the discussion. That is, all points made here depend on variations under
158. See id. § 4(a)(1), (b)(8).
159. To the extent it is not obvious, see Ronald A. Brand, The Continuing Evolution of U.S. Judgments
Recognition Law, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 277, 336–41 (2017).
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local law, but this review may give guidance. This summary does not include all
the nuances but does cover the basic issues in a 2005 Act enforcement.
A. SCOPE OF APPLICABILITY
As discussed in Part II, the 1962 and 2005 Acts apply to foreign-country
judgments that: (1) award or deny a sum of money; (2) are not directed to taxes,
fines, penalties or family law; and (3) are final, conclusive and enforceable in
the rendering country.160 Although litigation can arise on any aspect of the
scope,161 subject matter disputes require more clarification. That is, the subject
matter exclusions do not disqualify every such judgment. In family law, for
example, some judgments award money damages that arose in a support claim
but were not directed to support and therefore qualify for recognition.162 Similar

160. The 2005 Act states:
SECTION 3 APPLICABILITY.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), this [act] applies to a foreign-country
judgment to the extent that the judgment: (1) grants or denies recovery of a sum of money;
and (2) under the law of the foreign country where rendered is final, conclusive, and
enforceable.
(b) This [act] does not apply to a foreign-country judgment, even if the judgment grants or
denies recovery of a sum of money, to the extent that the judgment is: (1) a judgment for taxes,
(2) a fine or other penalty; or (3) a judgment for divorce, support, or maintenance, or other
judgment rendered in connection with domestic relations.
(c) A party seeking recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the burden of establishing
that this [act] applies to the foreign-country judgment.
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 3; see also UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT §§ 1–2 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 1962).
161. See DeTray v. AIG Ins. Co. of Can., No. 2:17-CV-0983 RAJ, 2018 WL 4184334, at *6 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 31, 2018) (holding that the Canadian court’s declaration of nonliability to Washington resident for accident
in Washington was not enforceable under Washington’s version of the 2005 Act because it was not for a sum of
money).
162. See Savage v. Zelent, 777 S.E.2d 801, 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that Scottish court’s award
of attorney fees and costs in failed support claim were within the 2005 Act’s scope) (citing persuasive authority
from Ohio and New York and cited no contrary authority). The same distinctions occurred under the 1962 Act.
See Burelle v. Gilbert, 806 N.Y.S.2d 443 (App. Term. 2005) (enforcing a Canadian judgment regarding marital
property distribution and finding this was not support but equitable property distribution) (decided under 1962
Act).
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distinctions occur with fines and penalties.163 The 2019 Registration Act ties into
the 2005 Act’s scope164 but clarifies on issues such as bankruptcy.165
B. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Forum competence is a common issue in the cross-border enforcement of
any judicial order. Competence includes personal jurisdiction (both amenability
and notice), subject matter jurisdiction, and venue. All three issues matter even
when challenging competence within one forum. Although venue tends to fade
in a cross-border analysis, all three are nonetheless considered below as they
may arise under the 2005 Act or the 2019 Registration Act. There are two
distinct questions: Was the rendering forum competent? Is the enforcing forum
competent? It is important to distinguish them either to establish or attack them.
1. The Rendering Forum
The rendering forum’s competence is governed initially by that forum’s
law, subject to safeguards under Sections 4 and 5 of the 2005 Act. Section 4 of
the 2005 Act imposes jurisdictional requirements, specifically that no foreigncountry judgment may be enforced unless it satisfies personal jurisdiction166 and
subject matter jurisdiction.167 Section 5 lists acceptable bases of personal
jurisdiction along with a catchall allowing the enforcing forum to find other
acceptable bases.
a. Personal Jurisdiction—Amenability and Notice
Personal jurisdiction is a frequent defense to foreign-country judgments168
and it is important to note both its components and the proper terminology.
Personal jurisdiction comprises amenability and notice.169 Amenability is the
163. See, e.g., L’Institute Nat’l De L’Audiovisuel v. Kultur Int’l Films, Ltd., No. CIV. 11-6309, 2012 WL
296997, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2012) (holding that French judgment for copyright infringement, obtained by a
French government agency, was compensatory and not penal) (decided under 1962 Act). See infra notes 262–
267 for further discussion of fines and penalties.
164. The 2019 Registration Act states:
SECTION 3. APPLICABILITY.
(a) This [act] supplies to a Canadian judgment to the extent the judgment is within the scope
of [cite to Section 3 of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act].
(b) A Canadian judgment that grants both recovery of a sum of money and other relief may
be registered under this [act], but only to the extent of the grant of monetary relief.
(c) A Canadian judgment regarding both subject matter within the scope of this [act] and
subject matter not within the scope of this [act] may be registered under this [act], but only to
the extent the judgment relates to subject matter within the scope of this [act].
UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 3 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).
165. See id. § 3 cmt. 1.
166. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(2) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005).
167. See id. § 4(b)(3).
168. Tanya J. Monestier, Whose Law of Personal Jurisdiction? The Choice of Law Problem in the
Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1729, 1731–32 (2016).
169. “Every foreign judgment, of whatever nature, in order to be entitled to any effect, must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon regular proceedings, and due notice.” Hilton v.
Goyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166–67 (1895). For more recent affirmations regarding foreign judgment recognition, see
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defendant’s susceptibility to a forum’s assertion of jurisdiction and is governed
both by the adjudicating forum’s law and a fairness standard.170 Notice is the act
of notifying defendants of the pending action, and it is also governed by the
adjudicating forum’s law and a due process or reasonableness standard.171 Both
elements—amenability and notice—are required to exercise adjudicatory
jurisdiction.172 That is, a defendant who resides in the forum is still not subject
to personal jurisdiction until proper notice is served. Similarly, nonresidents who
receive proper legal notice are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction unless they
have a sufficient connection to the adjudicating state. Terminology is sometimes
misapplied in analyzing these two. Although “notice” is generally used in the
proper context, “amenability” is sometimes discussed synonymously with
“personal jurisdiction.”173 Whatever terms are used, it’s important to remember
that both are required.
(1) Amenability
The judgment debtor’s amenability to the rendering forum is of course
governed initially by that jurisdiction’s law, at least when assessed there. Once
the foreign judgment is filed or registered in the United States, that earlier
assertion of personal jurisdiction must comply with Section 5 of the 2005 Act,
which lists six acceptable grounds for jurisdiction. That is, the enforcing court
must accept the rendering court’s jurisdiction if it is based on the defendant
having any one of six acts occur in the rendering jurisdiction: (1) personal
service; (2) voluntary appearance other than a special appearance; (3) a forum
clause; (4) domicile, or a business entity’s principal place of business or
incorporation there; (5) a business office with the claim arising from business
done there; or (6) operation of a motor vehicle or airplane related to the claim.174

AO Alfa-Bank v. Yakovlev, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 224–25 (2018) (discussing Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti
Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999)); see also DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d
373, 386 (5th Cir. 2015) (decided under 1962 Act).
170. In the United States, the fairness standard comes from constitutional due process. See, e.g., Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 470–72 (1985). In other countries, fairness may be imposed by local
law, and if not, then by a reasonableness standard under public international law. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 402–04 (AM. L. INST. 2017). In addition, jurisdictional reasonableness
is collectively imposed by other countries whose courts refuse to recognize judgments rendered without a
reasonable claim of defendant’s amenability to the forum.
171. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950).
172. See AO Alfa-Bank, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 224–25 (discussing Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 350 regarding
foreign-country judgment recognition). But see Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse, SA v. Fin. Software Sys.,
Inc., 703 F. App’x 79, 83 (3d Cir. 2017). Personal jurisdiction defense “refers only to the substantive dimensions
of personal jurisdiction, such as sufficient minimum contacts, and not the technical requirements for service of
process.” Id.
173. See, e.g., EOS Transp. Inc. v. Agri-Source Fuels LLC, 37 So. 3d 349 passim (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(discussing amenability under the larger heading of “personal jurisdiction”) (decided under 1962 Act); accord,
DeTray v. AIG Ins. Co. of Can., No. 2:17-CV-0983 RAJ, 2018 WL 4184334 passim (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31,
2018).
174. Section 5 of the 2005 Act reads:
(a) A foreign-country judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal
jurisdiction if: (1) the defendant was served with process personally in the foreign country;
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These six grounds are non-exclusive; the enforcing court may find other
acceptable grounds, but must accept these six grounds. Other than the examples
in Section 5, the 2005 Act does not discuss the law of personal jurisdiction or its
components and instead leaves that to the enforcing state’s law to interpret in
the recognition process.175 Defendants who have a feasible challenge to the
rendering forum’s jurisdiction should consider raising that challenge in the
rendering forum, although many defendants make a tactical choice to wait until
the resulting judgment is enforced.
When the question of the rendering forum’s competence reaches the
enforcing forum, courts have split on what law governs the rendering forum’s
amenability. Understanding the function of jurisdictional analysis—not only in
foreign-judgment enforcement but in all jurisdictional settings—requires
reference to the Supreme Court’s consistent application of a non-formulaic
approach. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court expressly rejected “any
talismanic jurisdictional formulas; ‘the facts of each case must [always] be
weighed’ in determining whether personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair
play and substantial justice.’”176 Emphasizing further that it was not merely a
factual determination, but one in which the formula was often vague, the Court
added that “any inquiry into ‘fair play and substantial justice’ necessarily
requires determinations ‘in which few answers will be written in black and
white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are
innumerable.’”177 The Court was referring of course to the due process test rather
than a state’s assertion of jurisdiction under its long arm rules. On that point, it
is important to remember that the due process test does not itself create
amenability, but merely serves as a limit on the various forum states’ long-arm
assertions, whose formulae have varied significantly. Amenability, then, is a
matter of various opinions controlled largely by often differing state and federal
opinions.
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceeding, other than for the purpose of
protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceeding or of contesting the
jurisdiction of the court over the defendant;
(3) the defendant, before the commencement of the proceeding, had agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign country when the proceeding was instituted or
was a corporation or other form of business organization that had its principal place of
business in, or was organized under the laws of, the foreign country;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign country and the proceeding in the foreign
court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of business done by the
defendant through that office in the foreign country; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign country and the
proceeding involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of that operation.]
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 5 (UNIF. L. C MM’N 2005).
175. See id. § 6 cmt. 4. For criticism of jurisdictional analyses in judgment enforcement, see generally
Monestier, supra note 168. For examples of jurisdictional issues that can arise, see infra notes 211–228 and
accompanying text.
176. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485–86 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Kulko
v. Cal. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
177. Id. at 486 n.29 (quoting Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92).
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The 2005 Act’s six jurisdictional bases in Section 5(a) should
accommodate most fact patterns. To allow for the flexibility inherent in
amenability questions, the 2005 Act’s Section 5(b) also gives the enforcing
forum the discretion to recognize other jurisdictional bases. Even so, many
enforcing courts have ignored Section 5(a)’s six bases, even where one or more
clearly applies, and instead analyzed the rendering forum’s jurisdiction under
one or more of three laws: (1) the rendering forum’s law,178 (2) the enforcing
forum’s long-arm law,179 or (3) the due process standard of International Shoe
and progeny.180 Some courts have applied combinations,181 including all
three.182 Arguments can be made for any of these, but a review of the 2005 Act
and preclusion principles should narrow the choices, as explained here:
(a) Applying the Rendering Forum’s Law: The 2005 Act is limited to a
foreign-country judgment that, “under the law of the foreign country where
rendered, is final, conclusive, and enforceable.”183 At least in countries where
enforceability required personal jurisdiction, it is clear that the rendering court’s
law applies to the qualifying determination of personal jurisdiction. But this does
not mean that the enforcing forum will invariably be analyzing the rendering
court’s law of jurisdiction. Because of preclusion, the rendering court’s
amenability law should require analysis in the enforcing forum in only one of

178. See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (not a default) (applying
only Nicaraguan law and reversed the rendering court’s finding of jurisdiction and concluding that it had not
followed Nicaraguan law); see also Naves v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., No. 03-08-00525-CV, 2009 WL 2900755,
at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2009). In Naves, the Texas Court of Appeals rejected a Brazilian court’s
jurisdiction to render a default judgment by applying only Brazilian law, relying on the Texas Uniform Foreign
Money Judgment Recognition Act and sections 36.0044(g) and 36.005(a)(2) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. Id. at *4. These two cases applied only the rendering court’s jurisdictional rules, but several
others have applied the rendering court’s law along with International Shoe’s due process standards. E.g., EOS
Transp. Inc., 37 So. 3d at 354 (decided under 1962 Act) (default in Canada) (enforcing court applied both
Canadian law and due process in holding that Canada lacked personal jurisdiction).
179. See Monks Own Ltd. v. Monastery of Christ in Desert, 142 P.3d 955, 961–62 (N.M. Ct. App.), aff’d,
168 P.3d 121 (N.M. 2006) (decided under 1962 Act) (default judgment in Ontario) (enforcing court in New
Mexico applied both the New Mexico long arm statute and due process).
180. See Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (explaining that Canadian
court’s personal jurisdiction over defendant must have been, “at a minimum, in compliance with the
requirements of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the due process clause of the United
States Constitution”), aff’d, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980); Royal Extrusions Ltd. v. Cont’l Window & Glass
Corp., 812 N.E.2d 554, 558–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (decided under 1962 Act). In Royal Extrusions, the judgment
debtor objected to Canadian jurisdiction in the original action, then challenged it again when the final Canadian
judgment was filed for enforcement in Illinois. Id. at 556–57. The Illinois court upheld Canadian jurisdiction
under Fourteenth Amendment due process, focusing on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980), Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. 462, and Illinois cases applying those principles. Id. at 558–59.
181. Perhaps the most common combination is the enforcing court’s long arm statute and due process. See,
e.g., Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905, 913–17 (N.D. Iowa 2002). A New York court
applied the rendering court’s law and New York state law but not due process. See Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce v. Saxony Carpet Co., 899 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (decided under 1962 Act).
182. See Evans Cabinet Corp. v. Kitchen Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 135, 144–46 (1st Cir. 2010). The case was
litigated on the merits in Canada and the judgment debtor challenged Canadian jurisdiction in the enforcing
court, which examined the jurisdictional laws of Quebec, Massachusetts, and federal due process to find a lack
of jurisdiction. Id. at 140, 144–46.
183. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a)(2) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005).
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three possible circumstances. First, if the judgment debtor objected to
amenability in the rendering forum (either by special or general appearance) and
lost the objection, the rendering forum’s decision may be preclusive of any
further review in the enforcing forum. That is, the enforcing forum should not
second-guess the rendering forum’s decision about its own law of jurisdiction.184
Second, if the judgment debtor failed to object in the rendering forum but
otherwise participated, that failure probably waived any objection to
amenability, depending on the rendering forum’s law. Once again, the enforcing
forum should defer to the rendering forum’s application of its law. Third, if the
judgment debtor failed to participate at all in the rendering forum’s litigation and
suffered a default judgment, then the amenability issue was not litigated and can
be raised in the enforcing court. Only the third scenario—default—calls for the
enforcing court to apply the rendering forum’s amenability law.185
(b) Applying the Enforcing Forum’s Long-Arm Law: Although some
courts have unquestioningly applied their own amenability law (not including
due process) to test the power of the rendering court, it is difficult to justify. The
practice is effectively the internationalization of the forum’s long arm rule, and
it violates Hilton’s description of the comity appropriate for foreign-country
judgments.186 Nonetheless, some courts have done that.187
(c) Applying Due Process/Minimum Contacts: If the enforcing court
chooses to apply a jurisdictional standard other than the six listed in Section 5(a)
of the 2005 Act, the most appropriate standard is International Shoe’s due
process test, and that is the choice of most enforcing courts either by itself or
along with the rendering or enforcing forum’s law.
In contemplating the new 2019 Registration Act, the drafters anticipated
that Canadian judgments would seldom rest on exorbitant jurisdictional
grounds.188 There are, however, several examples of various states rejecting
Canadian jurisdiction, but not because the Canadian standard was exorbitant.189
184. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 194 (1985) (quoting Chief Justice John Marshall in Elmendorf v.
Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159–60 (1825)). But see Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d. 1307,
1324–26 (S.D. Fla. 2009), which rejected the rendering court’s finding of jurisdiction in a litigated case, almost
certainly plain error.
185. See, e.g., EOS Transp., Inc. v. Agri-Source Fuels LLC, 37 So. 3d 349, 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(decided under 1962 Act); see also Monestier, supra note 168, at 1731–32 (arguing that only the enforcing
state’s law should determine the rendering court’s jurisdiction).
186. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 194.
187. See Evans Cabinet, 593 F.3d at 144–46 (applying Quebec law, Massachusetts law, and due process to
find no jurisdiction in the rendering court); DeJoria v. Maghreb Pretroleum Expl., SA, 804 F.3d 373, 386–89
(5th Cir. 2015) (applying Moroccan law, Texas law, and due process to uphold the rendering court’s
jurisdiction).
188. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY J UDGMENT ACT, Prefatory Note at 3 (UNIF. L. CMM’N
2019) (“There is a high expectation that Canadian courts ‘will follow procedures comporting with U.S. notions
of fundamental fairness and jurisdiction . . . .’”).
189. See DeTray v. AIG Ins. Co. of Can., No. 2:17-CV-0983 RAJ, 2018 WL 4184334, at *5 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 31, 2018); EOS Transp., Inc., 37 So. 3d at 354 (decided under 1962 Act); Att’y Gen. of Can. v. Gorman,
769 N.Y.S.2d 369, 373–75 (Civ. Ct. 2003) (holding that the judgment creditor failed to offer evidence of
Canada’s in personam jurisdiction); K & R Robinson Enters. Ltd. v. Asian Exp. Material Supply Co., 178 F.R.D.
332, 345 (D. Mass. 1998) (decided under 1962 Act).
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(2) Notice of the Rendering Forum’s Action
The 2005 Act addresses notice in several ways. Section (b)(2) forbids
recognition if the rendering court lacked personal jurisdiction.190 Because
personal jurisdiction requires both amenability and notice191 it is clear that the
2005 Act requires notice and forbids recognition without it. The 2005 Act’s due
process defenses include notice, consistent with the Mullane case.192 In addition
to Mullane’s basic notice standard, the 2005 Act also imposes the rendering
country’s notice standard (along with amenability) in its requirement that the
foreign-country judgment be enforceable under the rendering court’s law.193 In
addition to these requirements to serve notice, Section 4(c)(1) provides that the
enforcing court may discretionarily refuse to recognize the foreign-country
judgment if defendant did not receive notice in time to prepare a defense in the
rendering forum.194 Finally, Section 5(a)(1) recognizes amenability if the
judgment debtor was served with process personally in the foreign country.
In spite of these multiple notice references, the 2005 Act expressly
mentions notice in the rendering forum only once—Section 4(c)(1), providing a
discretionary ground for the enforcing court to dismiss if late notice in the
rendering forum hampered the judgment debtor’s defense there. Critics
complain that this lack of express references to notice (as opposed to implied
references in personal jurisdiction, due process, and the rendering court’s law)
has led courts to misconstrue the notice requirement,195 and it has. Some courts
have found no notice requirement,196 some have accepted actual notice as
sufficient,197 and some have imposed the strictest due process standards.198 In
cases upholding a notice requirement, there is disagreement about which law

190. Section 4(b) provides that, “[a] court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment
if . . . (2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b) (UNIF. L. C MM’N 2005).
191. The role of notice in creating personal jurisdiction goes back at least to 1869 in Bischhoff v. Wethered.
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 814 (1869) (holding that an English judgment without notice “was wholly without
jurisdiction of the person” and “can have no validity here”). Hilton echoed this in stating the prima facie validity
requirements for foreign-country judgments: “Every foreign judgment, of whatever nature, in order to be entitled
to any effect, must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon regular proceedings,
and due notice.” Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166–67. The Uniform Acts have, of course, not altered this.
192. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(1) (due process as a mandatory defense),
§ 4(c)(8) (giving the enforcing court discretion to reject a judgment rendered in questionable due process
grounds); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
193. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a)(2).
194. “A court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if: (1) the defendant in the
proceeding in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the defendant
to defend . . . .” Id. § 4(c)(1).
195. See Monestier, supra note 168, at 1774–83 and sources cited there.
196. E.g., Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse, SA v. Fin. Software Sys., 703 F. App’x 79, 83 (3d Cir. 2017).
197. See DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 387 (5th Cir. 2015).
198. E.g., Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc., 640 F.2d 77, 81 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928)) (determining that Dutch service of process was mailed to the United States and received
by the judgment debtor; in spite of that actual notice, the Dutch method was constitutionally inadequate because
the Dutch service rule did not require the Dutch official to mail the notice, thus failing the reasonably calculated
requirement).
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controls notice.199 As with amenability, it is doubtful that Canadian notice
standards will violate due process although the proceeding in a particular case
may.200
(3) Default Judgment in the Rendering Jurisdiction
A default judgment can implicate both amenability and notice issues.
Although a default judgment can only be set aside by the rendering forum, the
judgment debtor may prevent enforcement in the enforcing forum if the default
judgment’s basis of jurisdiction violates the 2005 Act’s requirements for
amenability201 or notice.202 Moreover, even though a foreign country default
judgment would still stand unless set aside where rendered, a collateral attack in
the enforcing forum may be preclusive on the issue of lack of amenability or
notice if that issue was not litigated earlier in the rendering forum.
A foreign default judgment is only a problem under the 2005 Act if it
becomes final.203 If a final default judgment from a foreign country is filed under
the 2005 Act, and if the judgment debtor earlier challenged the default in the
rendering forum, the rendering forum’s decision is preclusive of any challenge
in the enforcing forum unless the rendering forum’s standard violates the 2005
Act’s due process safeguard.204
b. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The 2005 Act blocks enforcement of a foreign-country judgment from a
court lacking subject matter jurisdiction.205 Unlike its treatment of personal
jurisdiction, the 2005 Act does not list acceptable bases for foreign subject
matter jurisdiction and it is obvious that the issue is controlled entirely by the
rendering forum’s law. If the defendant litigates the issue in the rendering forum,

199. See Naves v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., No. 03-08-00525-CV, 2009 WL 2900755, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App.
Sept. 10, 2009) (decided under 1962 Act) (applying only Brazilian law in finding lack of notice); Midbrook
Flowerbulbs Holland B.V. v. Holland Am. Bulb Farms, Inc., 874 F.3d 604, 617 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying only
Dutch law to uphold notice, holding that American due process doesn’t necessarily control); AO Alfa-Bank v.
Yakovlev, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 233–36 (Ct. App. 2018) (applying Russian law and the federal due process
standard); DeJoria, 804 F.3d at 386–87 (decided under 1962 Act) (applying Moroccan law, Texas law, and
federal due process); Syncrude Can. Ltd. v. Highland Consulting Grp., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626 (D. Md.
2013) (decided under 1962 Act) (holding that notice under the Hague Convention on Service of Process Abroad
was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co., v. Robinson Helicopter
Co., No. 2:06-CV-01798-FMCSSX, 2009 WL 10672970, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009) (holding that Hague
service sufficient where it also satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(3)).
200. See Vrozos v. Sarantopoulos, 552 N.E.2d 1093, 1097–98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (decided under 1962 Act);
Isack v. Isack, 733 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (decided under 1962 Act); K & R Robinson Enters.
Ltd. v. Asian Exp. Material Supply Co., 178 F.R.D. 332, 343 (D. Mass. 1998) (decided under 1962 Act).
201. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1) (UNIF. L. CMM’N
2005).
202. See id. § 4(b)(c)(7)–(8).
203. Interlocutory defaults are not enforceable under the 2005 Act, see id. § 3(a)(2) (finality requirement),
or for that matter under the common law. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 passim (1985).
204. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1), (c)(7)–(8).
205. See id. § 4(b)(3).
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that decision is preclusive of any collateral attack in the enforcing forum.206 If
the defendant waits to challenge subject matter jurisdiction until the foreign
judgment is filed in the United States under the 2005 Act, the rendering forum’s
law will control that question. The 2019 Registration Act makes no change to
this and defers entirely to the 2005 Act.
c. Venue
The 2005 Act does not mention venue in the rendering forum, and neither
does the 2019 Registration Act. As with other rendering-forum validity issues,
the matter is necessarily controlled by the rendering forum’s law.207 Venue
issues in the rendering forum are not grounds for objection in the enforcing
forum.
2. The Enforcing Forum
This Subpart focuses only on the enforcing forum’s jurisdiction.208 The
guidepost for the enforcing forum’s jurisdiction is found in Section 6, Comment
4 of the 2005 Act which provides that the judgment creditor’s filing in the
enforcing forum must comply with all procedural rules in the enforcing forum.
That is, the 2005 Act contemplates the filing of a new lawsuit that will use a
summary procedure to domesticate the foreign-country judgment. The 2019
Registration Act, in comparison, merely requires registration of the foreigncountry judgment which then becomes enforceable if the judgment debtor does
not raise objections within thirty days.209 In spite of the 2019 Registration Act’s
use of a registration procedure, the registration must still comply with the
enforcing forum’s procedure in several regards, as explained below. The overall
guidepost for both the 2005 Act’s and the 2019 Registration Act’s procedures is
that the enforcing forum’s law governs questions not otherwise addressed by the
2005 Act.
a. Personal Jurisdiction
(1) Amenability
The 2005 Act does not address amenability and disclaims any intent to do
so.210 The 2019 Registration Act serves merely as a corollary to the 2005 Act
and also refrains from addressing amenability in the enforcing state.211 To
summarize the two Acts’ position on enforcing state amenability, the 2005 Act
206. See supra notes 184–185 and accompanying text.
207. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 cmt. 2 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS ch. 5, topic 3, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1971)).
208. For a discussion of challenging the rendering forum’s jurisdiction in the enforcing court, see supra
notes 176–204 and accompanying text.
209. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 5.
210. “Nor does this Act address the question of what constitutes a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to
adjudicate with regard to an action under Section 6.” Id. § 6 cmt. 4.
211. The 2019 Registration Act uses the term “jurisdiction” eight times, none in reference to the enforcing
forum. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).
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directs that the judgment creditor can implement recognition by filing a new
lawsuit in the enforcing state212 on which a summary proceeding may be possible
unless the judgment debtor raises fact issues that require a trial. The 2019
Registration Act, serving merely as an inset to the 2005 Act, provides a
registration procedure that circumvents the summary proceeding unless the
judgment debtor raises objections requiring adjudication. In providing these two
approaches—filing and registering—the two Acts leave other procedural
questions to the enforcing state’s law.213
The enforcing state’s law, then, controls procedural aspects of the foreign
judgment’s processing, including the requirements for the judgment debtor’s
amenability there.214 This should be a matter of routine but can raise interesting
questions, based partly on how we perceive the domestication of foreign-country
judgments. One view is that domestication is a new lawsuit that the plaintiff
hopes will lead to a summary judgment based on the preclusive effect of the
judgment rendered in the foreign country.215 This view, of course, suggests that
the defendant/judgment debtor be traditionally amenable to the forum state. A
different view is that domestication is necessarily a summary proceeding
(assuming the foreign judgment qualifies) based on valid and final litigation
concluded elsewhere. This second view supports but does not compel the
conclusion that full-fledged amenability does not apply and instead the only
issue is the presence of the judgment debtor’s assets.
Both arguments are plausible, and courts have gone in both directions,
though not necessarily articulating the bases stated above. This has led to at least
three positions on the requirement for the judgment debtor’s amenability in the
enforcing forum. The first is that the judgment debtor must be subject to standard
amenability under the enforcing forum’s long arm rules and due process.216 The
second position is that some forms of in rem jurisdiction may be acceptable.217
212. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6(a).
213. “While this Section sets out the ways in which the issue of recognition of a foreign-country judgment
may be raised, it is not intended to create any new procedure not currently existing in the state or to otherwise
effect existing state procedural requirements. The parties to an action in which recognition of a foreign-country
judgment is sought under Section 6 must comply with all state procedural rules with regard to that type of
action.” Id. §6 cmt. 4.
214. See id; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 99 (AM. L. INST. 1971) (local law
governs enforcement methods).
215. Comment 3 of Section 6 of the 2005 Act undermines this view with the statement that, “[a]n action
seeking recognition of a foreign-country judgment under this Section is an action on the foreign-country
judgment itself, not an action on the underlying cause of action that gave rise to that judgment.” UNIF. FOREIGNCOUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6 cmt. 3. However, that comment goes on to explain that
the characterization as a mere action on the judgment means that the defendant cannot relitigate the merits. Id.
As noted above, comment 4 of Section 6 further provides that the enforcing forum’s law controls procedure and
jurisdiction for the enforcement action. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
216. See Ronald A. Brand, Federal Judicial Center International Litigation Guide: Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 506 (2013) (discussing Base Metal Trading Ltd. v.
OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory,” 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2002) (decided under 1962 Act)).
217. See Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., 677 N.W.2d 874, 878, 885–86 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003) (decided under 1962 Act) (enforcing court may exercise in personam or in rem jurisdiction, but Michigan
had neither in this case); Intrigue Shipping, Inc. v. Shipping Assocs., Inc., No. FSTCV135014113S, 2013 WL
6978815, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2013) (decided under 1962 Act) (citing several cases, holding that
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The third position is that there is no need to establish in personam or in rem
jurisdiction in the enforcing forum.218 The 2005 Act observes this split of
authority, noting that the Supreme Court provided a possible basis for in rem
jurisdiction in its Shaffer v. Heitner opinion.219 Interestingly, the Canadian
Supreme Court took the third position in 2015.220
There is no indication that the 2019 Registration Act adopts any of these
three positions, which is consistent with the 2005 Act’s non-position here.
Nonetheless, because the 2019 Registration Act removes the requirement of a
new lawsuit and substitutes a registration procedure that will be clerical in many
cases, the argument can be made that the 2019 Registration Act is all the more a
summary proceeding against assets, consistent with any local judgment
enforcement. How that directs the jurisdictional analysis is for the enforcing
forum to decide.
Yet another question is the amenability required for a third-party asset
holder. The 2005 Act’s jurisdictional defenses refer to “defendant” even though
in some cases the filing in the United States may be against another party such
as a garnishee. The 2019 Registration Act acknowledges this with references to
“the person against whom the judgment is being registered”221 or similar
phrases. No cases on point were found, but this would seem to be an in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdictional assertion to be decided under the enforcing state’s
law.

proof of personal jurisdiction unnecessary and further that judgment creditor alleged presence of assets in
forum); Electrolines, Inc., 677 N.W.2d at 880 (decided under 1962 Act) (holding that there must be an in
personam basis if judgment creditor fails to allege presence of property); Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co.,
202 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977)) (decided
under 1962 Act) (holding that there is no need for personal jurisdiction in judgment enforcement cases). Note
that Pure Fishing, Inc. is discussed above for the point requiring the minimum contacts standard for personal
jurisdiction for rendering courts. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
218. New York courts (following the 1962 Act) have articulated this more than courts in other states. See
Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (App. Div. 2001) (decided under 1962 Act) (holding
that no in personam jurisdiction is necessary and no property need be present; often cited for that point), clarified
in AlbaniaBEG Ambient Sh.p.k. v. Enel S.p.A., 73 N.Y.S.3d 1, 3 (App. Div. 2018) (decided under 1962 Act)
(holding that if defendant raises objection under the 2005 Act, then enforcing court must have a jurisdictional
basis, in personam or in rem), further clarified in Diaz v. Galopy Corp. Int’l, N.V., 79 N.Y.S.3d 494, 498 (Sup.
Ct. 2018) (finding that if no defense raised under the 2005 Act, then no need for any proof of jurisdiction). For
other states, see Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda) Ltd., 260 S.W.3d 476, 481 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008)
(decided under 1962 Act) (determining that there was no need for in personam or in rem, following Lenchyshyn).
Accord Beluga Chartering B.V. v. Timber S.A., 294 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App. 2009) (decided under 1962
Act); see also Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v. Saad Trading, Contracting & Fin. Servs. Co., 986 N.Y.S.2d
454, 457–58 (App. Div. 2014).
219. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6 cmt. 4 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S.
at 210 n.36 (1977) (“Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a
debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a
State where the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the
existence of the debt as an original matter.”)).
220. See Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 69, paras. 63–77 (Can.).
221. E.g., UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 4(b)(4) (UNIF . L. CMM’N 2019).
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(2) Notice in the Enforcing Forum
Although there are differing theories on amenability in the enforcing
forum, it is inconceivable that enforcement would not entail sufficient notice.
The 1962 Act did not provide a filing procedure, which resulted in confusion on
a few points including notice.222 The 2005 Act clarified the filing procedure with
a new section specifying that for newly initiated recognition actions, the process
is commenced “by filing an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country
judgment.”223 Similarly, a party may raise a foreign judgment in a pending claim
(for preclusion, offset, or as a distinct enforcement claim) by counterclaim,
cross-claim, or affirmative defense.224 The comment to Section 6 emphasizes
that the 2005 Act’s process is a new lawsuit which must comply with all local
procedures in the enforcing state, and that the Act itself does not create any
supplemental procedures other than the codifying the common law of
preclusion.225 The filing of a new action necessarily requires the notice that goes
with that action under the enforcing state’s law. The success of that 2005 change
may be measured by the lack of notice cases arising in the adopting states.
The 2019 Registration Act goes further and provides a distinct notice
section which requires notice “in the same manner that a summons and
[complaint] must be served”226 under the 2005 Act. The drafting committee
considered less notice such as certified mail under the theory that the 2019
Registration Act is a registration procedure rather than a new lawsuit, and the
judgment debtor would have already had notice of the foreign judgment. This,
of course, raised the problem of default judgments in the foreign jurisdiction,
and the drafting committee could not design an effective means of a distinct
notice requirement only for foreign defaults. As a result, the drafting committee
decided to require the same notice as required under the 2005 Act, which is the
notice given when filing a new lawsuit in the enforcing state. Although the
terminology may vary, this means a summons or praecipe issued and served
under the enforcing state’s law.
In some instances, the 2005 Act or the 2019 Registration Act could be used
against a party other than the judgment debtor. One example is a garnishment
action against a bank holding funds for the judgment debtor. Several questions
arise for this setting, and one is the notice required for the judgment debtor and
the third-party asset holder. Neither the 2005 Act nor the 2019 Registration Act

222. Perhaps the most pointed reaction came from a Texas court of appeals which held the Texas version of
the 1962 Act unconstitutional for its lack of a notice provision. See Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122, 124
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The case did not go to the Texas Supreme Court so there was no immediate opportunity
to reverse it, but the Texas Supreme Court disapproved of it in Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enters.,
Ltd., pointing out that the 1962 Act implicitly required the filing of a new lawsuit including notice and an
opportunity to object. 794 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex. 1990). After Docksteader’s initial proceedings, the Texas
legislature amended its version of the 1962 Act to clarify the procedural steps. Id. at 761 n.1.
223. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6(a) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005).
224. Id. § 6(b).
225. Id. § 6 cmt. 4. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
226. Id. § 6.
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address this, but it should be clear from both Acts that the enforcing state’s law
controls.
(3) Defaulting in the Enforcing Forum
This Subpart considers the effect of a default in the enforcing forum, not a
default in the rendering forum.227 Under the 2005 Act, the judgment creditor is
pursuing a new claim and has the burden of proving the judgment debtor’s
obligation by using the foreign-country judgment as preclusive. The judgment
debtor has the ordinary answer time available under the enforcing state’s law for
a lawsuit. If the judgment debtor fails to answer, its default would presumably
concede the judgment creditor’s case, subject to a prove up with other variations
according to the enforcing state’s law. The 2019 Registration Act does not
contemplate a new lawsuit but the judgment debtor nonetheless has thirty days
to respond and raise a defense.228 If the judgment debtor fails to respond, the
resulting default would immediately implement enforcement.
b. Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the Enforcing Forum
The 2005 Act implicitly requires that a proper court in the enforcing state
be used for its instructed process of filing a new lawsuit seeking recognition of
the foreign-country judgment.229 This necessarily includes an enforcing state’s
court with subject matter jurisdiction, including the proper amount in
controversy.230 The Registration Act expressly points to the 2005 Act’s courtselection requirement.231 If the judgment creditor files or registers in the wrong
court, not only may the judgment debtor object, but the improper court’s
resulting actions may be invalidated subject to the enforcing state’s law.
c. Venue in the Enforcing Forum
Neither the 2005 Act nor the 2019 Registration Act address venue at the
recognition/enforcing stage. Because both Acts emphasize their deference to the
enforcing state’s law on procedural questions, it should be clear that venue is
227. For a discussion of default judgments in the rendering forum, see supra notes 201–204 and
accompanying text.
228. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT §§ 5(b), 7 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).
229. UNIF. FOREIGN -COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6(a). If recognition of a foreigncountry judgment is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition shall be raised by filing an action
seeking recognition of the foreign-country judgment.
230. See, e.g., Sask. Mut. Ins. Co. v. CE Design, Ltd., 865 F.3d 537, 540–42 (7th Cir. 2017) (filing
enforcement action in Illinois federal court and court dismissing for lack of diversity jurisdiction). The issue
may also be the appellate court’s jurisdiction on a timely-filed appeal, as discussed in N.H. Ins. Co. v. Magellan
Reinsurance Co., No. 02-11-00334-CV, 2013 WL 105654, at *3–5 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2013) (decided under
1962 Act) (acknowledging the need for jurisdiction but finding it existed there).
231. Section § 4(a) of the 2019 Registration Act states:
A person seeking recognition of a Canadian judgment in order to enforce the judgment may
register the judgment in the office of the [clerk] of a court in which an action for recognition
of the judgment could be filed under [cite to Section 6 of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act].
UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 4(a).
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governed for actions under both the 2005 Act and the 2019 Registration Act by
the enforcing state’s law. Some states have modified their foreign-judgment Act
to include a venue provision.232 When Texas adopted the 2005 Act in 2017, it
did not include a venue rule, so its version presumably defaults to Texas’s
standard venue rules. There are no reported rulings on this question from a state
applying the 2005 Act.
The United States’ UEFJA for sister-state judgment enforcement also lacks
a venue rule for the enforcing state, and that has led some courts to conclude that
there is no venue rule and the judgment creditor may pursue enforcement in any
court or district in the enforcing state.233 Other states have interpreted the sisterstate Act’s silence on venue as calling for the general venue rule in those
states.234 As noted above, there are no reported rulings on enforcing state venue
under the 2005 Act. Whatever the approach—general venue or venue-free—it is
up to the enforcing state’s law.
C. NON-JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE FOREIGN-COUNTRY JUDGMENT
Section 4 of the 2005 Act provides two categories of defenses—mandatory
and discretionary—to the foreign-country judgment’s recognition or
enforcement. As with many other issues in the 2005 Act, the enforcing court
must decide whether the objection is sufficient to justify rejection of the foreigncountry judgment.
1. Mandatory Grounds for Dismissal
The mandatory dismissal grounds in Section 4(b) are that the rendering
forum (1) was part of a judicial system “that does not provide impartial tribunals
or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;”235 (2)
232. See, for example, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.0041, requiring filing in “the county of
residence of the party against whom recognition is sought or in any other court of competent jurisdiction as
allowed under the Texas venue laws.” Id. (repealed 2017).
233. See L & R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530, 533–36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011) (determining that
there was no venue requirement for sister-state judgment registrations in Colorado, reasoning that a judgment
enforcement under full faith and credit is not an “action” under Colorado venue law).
234. See Garrett v. Okla. Panhandle State Univ., 156 P.3d 48, 50–51 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Cherwood,
Inc. v. Marlin Leasing Corp., 601 S.E.2d 356, 357–58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Cantu v. Howard S. Grossman, P.A.,
251 S.W.3d 731, 737–38, 741–42 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
235. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §4(b)(1) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005).
Note that this mandatory ground requires the judgment debtor to show that the foreign legal system lacks
impartiality or due process in its entirety and not just in that particular case. See DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum
Expl., SA, 804 F.3d 373, 382 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the judgment debtor failed to prove that the Moroccan
system was deficient as a whole). Contrast this with the discretionary ground under section 4(c)(7) of the 2005
Act which focuses only on the foreign judgment at issue. UNIF. FOREIGN -COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION § 4(c)(7). Revolution or war has been a successful argument that the foreign judicial system was
defective. See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2000), in which the court declined to
recognize a Liberian judgment rendered during the Liberian Civil War, noting that “Liberia’s judicial system
was in a state of disarray and the provisions of the Constitution concerning the judiciary were no longer
followed.” Id. at 138; see also Harris Corp. v. Nat’l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1357 (11th Cir.
1982) (‘‘[T]he Islamic regime now governing Iran has shown a deep hostility toward the United States and its
citizens, thus making effective access to the Iranian courts unlikely.’’); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406,
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lacked personal jurisdiction;236 or (3) lacked subject matter jurisdiction.237 The
jurisdictional issues are discussed above.238 As to impartial tribunals, the
judgment debtor must show that the failing exists with the entire judicial system
as a whole as opposed to the events occurring in that particular case.239 Few
countries are found to meet this low standard, and never Canada.
2. Discretionary Grounds for Dismissal
Section 4(c) lists eight discretionary grounds for rejecting the foreigncountry judgment. They are (1) lack of notice of the foreign proceeding “in
sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend”;240 (2) “the judgment was
obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunity to
present its case”;241 (3) “the judgment or underlying claim is repugnant to the
public policy of this state or of the United States”;242 (4) “the judgment conflicts
1411–13 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to enforce Iranian judgment and concluding that the Iranian judicial system
did not comport with due process). At the other extreme, the mere lack of American litigation opportunities is
often an unsuccessful challenge. See Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2000)
(finding the English system acceptable even though it lacks the United States concept of pre-trial discovery);
Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2002); Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d
680, 688 (7th Cir. 1987).
236. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(2).
237. Id. § 4(b)(3).
238. See supra notes 166–204 and accompanying text (personal jurisdiction), 205–206 and accompanying
text (subject matter jurisdiction).
239. See Bank Melli Iran, 58 F.3d at 1410, 1413 (decided under 1962 Act). In contrast, section 4(c)(7)–(8)
of the 2005 Act provide discretionary grounds based on a lack of due process or doubting the rendering court’s
integrity in a particular case. See infra note 246 and accompanying text (referencing DeJoria v. Maghreb
Petroleum Expl., S.A., 935 F.3d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 2019)).
240. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(1).
241. Id. § 4(c)(2).
242. Id. § 4(c)(3). In general, the public policy defense is difficult to prevail on. See Allianz Suisse
Versicherungs-Gesellschaft v. Miller, 24 F. Supp. 3d 670, 676–79 (W.D. Mich. 2014) (explaining the difficult
standard while holding that a Swiss judgment for hockey injuries sustained in Switzerland did not violate the
enforcing state’s public policy). Among other limits, a mere difference in law is insufficient. See UNIF. FOREIGNCOUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS R ECOGNITION ACT § 4 cmt. 8. That the difference concerns fundamental rights
in the United States may not be enough. See Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1013 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that the emotional distress judgment in Japan against church did not violate religion clause under
California or United States law). On the other hand, the defense sometimes works when invoking rights less than
religious freedom. See Aguerre v. Schering-Plough Corp., 924 A.2d 571, 582 (N.J. App. Div. 2007) (decided
under 1962 Act) (ruling in favor of judgment debtors’ public policy defense based on their objection that the
Argentine judgment that violated the rights of whistle blowers). A North Carolina court explained public policy
based on the 2005 Act’s definition: “Public policy is violated only if recognition of the foreign-country judgment
would tend clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, or the public confidence in the administration
of the law, or would undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of
private property, which any citizen ought to feel.” Savage v. Zelent, 777 S.E.2d 801, 809 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015)
(quoting the North Carolina version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Recognition Act, North Carolina General
Statutes section 1C-1853(c)(3) cmt. 8, consistent with the 2005 Act section 4 cmt. 8) (denying judgment debtor’s
public policy challenge to a Scottish judgment for attorney fees and costs). As a mostly common law jurisdiction,
Canadian judgments will be even less likely to be refused on public policy grounds, but it has happened. See
Jaffe v. Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 584, 598 (4th Cir. 2002) (decided under 1962 Act). Jaffe was a
Canadian default judgment against a bail bond company and its agents for kidnapping plaintiff. Virginia refused
to enforce the Canadian judgment because a Florida court (where it was originally brought for enforcement)
refused to give it recognition. Id. Florida would not recognize the Canadian judgment because doing so would
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with another final and conclusive judgment”;243 (5) “the proceeding in the
foreign court was contrary to forum agreement between the parties”;244 (6) “in
the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a
seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action”;245 (7) “substantial doubt
about the rendering court’s integrity with respect to the judgment”;246 or (8) “the
specific proceeding in the foreign court was not compatible with the
requirements of due process of law.”247 Several of these eight discretionary
grounds have no reported decisions. That does not mean the challenges are not
raised, but merely that they did not result in case law.
D. GOVERNING LAW BEYOND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Choice of law rules in the United States are more court-made than
legislative and tend to be governed by state and not federal law.248 This state law
dominance is subject to a few constitutionally compelled exceptions. The only
one relevant here is the due process requirement that the chosen law be
reasonably related to the dispute.249 If the United States ratifies the new Hague
Judgments Convention, it is possible that Congress will federalize foreigncountry judgment enforcement, which may change some of the governing law
points noted below. In the current arrangement, whether the judgment creditor
contravene Florida’s public policy which promotes the apprehending of fugitives. Id. The most notable public
policy issue between the United States and Canada concerns Canadian defamation judgments which would be
barred in the United States by the First Amendment. In reaction to such judgments from Canada and other
countries, Congress enacted the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage
(SPEECH) Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101 et seq, and Canadian case law provided some of the motivation. See, e.g.,
Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. V. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2013). Even without the federal statute, it is
likely the public policy grounds in the 2005 Act would be grounds to reject the foreign defamation judgments.
Just to be sure, three states have amended their foreign-country judgment acts to provide an extra defense against
defamation judgments rendered in foreign countries. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1725 (2019) (effective Jan. 1,
2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 718A (2015) (effective Nov. 1, 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.6055 (2019) (effective
July 1, 2009) (amending its version of the 1962 Act). The amendments do not appear to be from a uniform or
standardized statute.
243. UNIF. FOREIGN -COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(4).
244. Id. § 4(c)(5); see, e.g., Montebueno Mkt., Inc. v. Del Monte Corp-USA, 570 Fed. App’x 675, 676 (9th
Cir. 2014) (denying recognition based on violation of arbitration clause designating the Philippines).
245. UNIF. FOREIGN -COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(6).
246. Id. § 4(c)(7). Note the difference between the 2005 Act’s section 5(a)(1) defense of impartial tribunal
(which looks to the foreign country’s system as a whole), and sections 5(c)(7) and (8) (which look only to the
particular proceedings leading to the judgment in question). See DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 935
F.3d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 2019).
247. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(8). Under state and federal
law in the United States, due process entails many specific rights in litigation. But when applied to foreigncountry judgments, the due process concept does not guarantee those same rights and instead assures
fundamental fairness. See Midbrook Flowerbulbs Holland B.V. v. Holland Am. Bulb Farms, Inc., 874 F.3d 604,
615–16 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that Dutch court’s discovery rulings did not render the Dutch judgment
fundamentally unfair).
248. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938). When federal courts have attempted to craft
choice of law rules for diversity cases, calling it a function of federal common law, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly reversed those courts and redirected them to the local state’s choice of law rule. E.g., Day &
Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4–5 (1975).
249. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410–11 (1930).
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uses a state or federal court to enforce a foreign-country judgment, the choice of
law calculus will be drawn from the enforcing state’s rule.
Choice of law rules are also overwhelmingly directed to substantive legal
issues. Because most of the enforcement issues are procedural, even when
involving two countries, it is a general rule that the rendering jurisdiction’s law
will control most issues up to the point of filing under the 2005 Act, or
registering under the 2019 Registration Act, and the enforcing jurisdiction’s law
will control most questions in the enforcing jurisdiction from that point.250 That
approach will get most answers correct, but not all.
1. In the Rendering Court
The most puzzling choice of law questions will arise in the enforcing court.
The governing law decisions made in the rendering court will typically concern
the merits of the initial case, and those decisions must be litigated and then
appealed in the rendering jurisdiction. Once that initial judgment is final, the
choice of law decisions made there are generally unassailable.251
One possible exception is legislative jurisdiction. That is, if the rendering
court chooses a law (including its own) that lacks a reasonable connection to the
dispute, then the judgment debtor may have an objection in the enforcing court
under the enforcing forum’s public policy or jurisdictional standards.252 This
could be true even if the judgment debtor argued and lost the point in the
rendering jurisdiction, if the rendering jurisdiction failed to apply the correct
reasonableness standard followed in the United States. There are no known
examples of the rendering forum’s choice of law decisions being challenged in
the enforcing court. To be clear, there are several cases challenging the fairness
of the law applied in the rendering court,253 but not because the law lacked a
reasonable connection to the dispute. If the rendering court had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant/judgment debtor, it very likely has legislative
jurisdiction, at least to the extent of applying its own substantive law.
2. In the Enforcing Court
Once again, the forum’s choice of law rule applies, subject to due process
(legislative jurisdiction) limits.254
a. Forum Clauses
Forum clause disputes will of course relate to the rendering forum’s
jurisdiction because parties do not draft forum clauses for judgment
250. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 (AM. L. INST. 1971) (explaining that local law
governs enforcement methods).
251. Reconsidering the rendering forum’s choice of law decisions would be relitigating the original case.
See supra notes 136–140 and accompanying text.
252. The United States Supreme Court recognized the due process limitation on choice of law in Home Ins.
Co., 281 U.S. at 411, and later cases. See generally HAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 157–66.
253. See infra notes 290–297 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.

November 2020]

MONEY JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT

147

enforcement. The Author, at least, has never heard of one. But even though the
forum clause dispute will focus on the rendering forum, the dispute can occur in
the enforcing forum in two distinct scenarios: First, the judgment debtor may
object to amenability in the rendering court under Section 4(b)(2) of the 2005
Act, a mandatory grounds for dismissal in the enforcing court. This is an
example of a prorogating clause—one that supports (or is argued as supporting)
the plaintiff’s choice of forum.
Second, the judgment debtor may object under the 2005 Act’s section
4(c)(5) that the judgment creditor’s original filing in the rendering court was
contrary to the parties’ forum clause designation of another place. That is called
a derogating clause—one that undermines plaintiff’s choice of forum—and it’s
a discretionary ground for dismissal.
In both instances—prorogating and derogating clauses—if the issue was
litigated in the rendering court, then the results there are likely preclusive of any
reconsideration in the enforcing court. Additionally, if the judgment debtor
participated in the rendering forum long enough to submit to the jurisdiction but
failed to object to a prorogating clause or assert their rights under the derogating
clause, then the issue is likely waived. But if the judgment debtor defaulted, then
the forum clause issue can be raised in the enforcing forum, and that brings up
the choice of law issue.
For both categories—prorogating and derogating—the enforcing court will
have to consider the clause’s validity, interpretation, and ultimately its
enforceability.255 Those questions are difficult enough in routine litigation. The
choice of law permutations are too complex to address briefly here but are
conceptually more difficult when two forums are involved, and the second is
analyzing the first’s jurisdiction based on a forum clause that one jurisdiction
may accept and the other may not. The fallback rule may be that the enforcing
forum’s choice of law rule should control as to all three issues—validation,
interpretation, and enforceability.
These potential complexities often go unnoticed. In a typical foreignjudgment-enforcement case involving forum clauses, the court does not engage
in a complex choice of law analysis.256 That simple approach is justified in most
cases because the court applies the forum’s choice of law without objection. The
only foreign-judgment case found involving a detailed choice of law analysis of
a forum clause is from a federal court in Kansas, a common law state that has

255. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 62–64 (2013); James P. George, Forum
Clauses at the Margin, 71 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 333–49 (2019).
256. See Dart v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (decided under 1962 Act) (enforcing
Australian judgment because forum clause did not deprive Australia of jurisdiction); Courage Co. v. Chemshare
Corp., 93 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (decided under 1962 Act) (denying enforcement of Japanese
judgment in deference to arbitration clause); Montebueno Mktg., Inc. v. Del Monte Corp.-USA, 570 Fed. App’x
675, 677 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying enforcement of Philippine judgment based on contract arbitration clause, no
analysis of clause); Iraq Middle Mkt. Dev. Found. v. Harmoosh, 848 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 2017) (decided
under 1962 Act) (enforcing an Iraqi judgment over forum clause objection because judgment debtor waived
right to arbitration by voluntarily participating in the foreign litigation; applying forum law with no analysis of
the clause itself).
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never adopted either of the Uniform Acts regarding foreign-country
judgments.257 In spite of that sole Kansas case, forum clauses are potential
trouble spots in 2005 Act cases.
b. Classifying the Foreign Judgment as Within the 2005 Act’s Scope
What law governs the characterization of the Canadian judgment in regard
to its coming within the scope of the 2019 Registration Act? Claims and
remedies sometimes have differing interpretations from one jurisdiction to
another. Although the rendering court’s law labels a dispute one way, the
enforcing court’s law may see it another way. The difference does not matter if
the claim’s altered label is nonetheless covered by the 2019 Registration Act,
but if the re-defined claim or remedy falls outside the 2019 Registration Act’s
scope, then the foreign-country judgment will not qualify for the 2005 Act or the
2019 Registration Act.258 Interestingly, the foreign claim or remedy is at that
point controlled by the enforcing state’s law because the question is whether the
foreign-country judgment falls within the scope of the enforcing state’s version
of the 2005 Act.
Because the 2005 Act’s scope excludes domestic relations judgments,259
those cases sometimes provide examples for claim re-labeling. In a Scottish
court, Julie Zelent sued Alan Savage for support after their relationship failed.
Zelent lost her case and the court awarded Savage £148,516.75 in attorney fees
and costs.260 Savage filed the resulting Scottish judgment in North Carolina
which upheld it, applying North Carolina law to characterize the Scottish
judgment as one for attorney fees (a sum of money) and not for support or
alimony.261
An example of remedy re-labeling is the judgment debtor’s challenge of a
damage award as a fine or penalty which falls outside the 2005 Act’s scope.262
In De Fontbrune v. Wofsy,263 a 2001 French judgment awarded de Fontbrune
damages for Wofsy’s copyright infringement in reprinting Picasso’s work. The
French court also imposed a sanction, or astreinte, of €10,000 for each future
violation. Ten years later de Fontbrune brought another French action to enforce
the 2001 astreinte, and this time won two million euros for Wofsy’s multiple
violations. When de Fontbrune sought enforcement in California, Wofsy

257. See Herr Indus., Inc. v. CTI Sys., SA, 112 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1178 (D. Kan. 2015) (common law
recognition) (applying an Atlantic Marine analysis as to validity, interpretation and enforcement).
258. Common law preclusion may be an option as long as the redefined claim or remedy does not violate
the enforcing state’s public policy. See supra notes 2–15 and accompanying text.
259. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(b)(3) (UNIF. L. CMM’N
2005); see also UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019)
(linking the 2019 Registration Act’s scope to that of the 2005 Act).
260. See Savage v. Zelent, 777 S.E.2d 801, 803–04 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
261. Id. at 804–07 (citing similar holdings from Ohio and New York).
262. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(b)(2); see also UNIF.
REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 3(a) (linking the 2019 Registration Act’s scope to that
of the 2005 Act).
263. De Fontbrune v. Wofsy, 838 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2016).
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objected that the astreinte was a penalty or fine and therefore uncollectible.264
The lower court agreed and dismissed the enforcement action but the Ninth
Circuit reversed. In determining that the astreinte was merely a judgment for a
sum of money and not a penalty, the court of appeals applied California law to
characterize the astreinte’s function, but was influenced by French law’s
description as an enforcement of a private right and not a public sanction.265
To the extent the labeling question involves arguments about penalties, the
enforcing forum’s law is likely to dominate because the old common law rule
rejected penalties from other jurisdictions. Nonetheless, the common law rule
itself calls for an examination of the foreign law’s purpose, as done in the de
Fontbrune case.266 Apart from the penalty label, foreign judgments are also
objected to as excessive and thus violating public policy, although the challenge
is difficult to maintain.267
As shown in the examples above, damages challenges are often piecemeal,
attacking only one portion of the judgment such as punitive damages or some
other line item. The 2005 Act addresses mixed judgments and line-item
challenges with its “to the extent” language.268 In spite of that language, at least
one court has questioned whether recognition under the 2005 Act permits lineitem damages challenge.269 The 2019 Registration Act further emphasizes the
ability to enforce only portions of a mixed judgment (aiding the judgment
creditor) and also facilitates challenges (aiding the judgment debtor) by
264. Id. at 995.
265. Id. at 1000–06.
266. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) is the definitive common law statement about penalties in
the United States. In Huntington, the Supreme Court drew from United States case law, English case law, and
Blackstone’s Commentaries to come up with the following definition.
The question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects may be called penal, is a
penal law in the international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another State,
depends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offence against the public
justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.
Huntington, 146 U.S. at 673–74. Huntington is still invoked in judgment enforcement cases including those
under the 2005 Act. E.g., De Fontbrune, 838 F.3d at 1001; L’Institute Nat’l de L’Audiovisuel v. Kultur Int’l
Films, Ltd., No. CIV. 11-6309, 2012 WL 296997, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2012) (finding that French judgment was
remedial and not penal); Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E.2d 321, 323–24 (Mass. 1992) (finding
that Canadian damages were remedial rather than a penalty); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman, 665 F.
Supp. 73, 75 (D. Mass. 1987) (finding that Belgian damages from civil case but related to criminal activity were
remedial and not penal); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 89, 89 cmt. d, 98, 120 cmt.
d (AM. L. INST. 1971).
267. See, e.g., Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 711–12 (Tex.
App. 1998) (enforcing Canadian judgment over objections that the Canadian court’s measure of damages for
patent infringement was excessive and violated public policy).
268. Section 3(a) of the 2005 Act that the Act applies “to the extent that the judgment: (1) grants or denies
recovery of a sum of money; and (2) under the law of the foreign country where rendered, is final, conclusive,
and enforceable.” UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a). Section 3(b) repeats
this in its exclusion of certain judgments, stating that the Act does not apply “to the extent that the judgment is:
(1) a judgment for taxes; (2) a fine or other penalty; or (3) a judgment for divorce, support, or maintenance, or
other judgment rendered in connection with domestic relations”). Id. § 3(b).
269. “We find no authority for the proposition that the circuit court can pick and choose the portions of a
foreign court’s order that will be recognized and enforced.” CE Design Ltd. v. HealthCraft Prods., Inc., 79
N.E.3d 325, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
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requiring the judgment creditor to designate which portions of the foreigncountry judgment are being pursued in the enforcing forum.270
c. Finality in the Rendering Jurisdiction
Judgment finality is a basis for disqualifying the foreign-country
judgment.271 Although the issue would seemingly be governed by the rendering
jurisdiction’s law, arguments sometimes arise when the enforcing forum’s
definition of finality differs from that in the rendering forum. A common ground
for the differing definitions is the effect of appeal on finality—does appeal
postpone enforcement, or must the judgment debtor post a bond pending the
appeal’s outcome?
Those differing views apply only to a jurisdiction’s internal treatment of its
own judgments, but what happens when the jurisdiction is assessing a judgment
from another jurisdiction? In the United States, full faith and credit requires that
states give sister-state judgments the same effect they have in the rendering
state.272 Should that view apply to foreign-country judgments? The California
Supreme Court offered a thorough discussion in Manco Contracting Co.
(W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian273 in which it disapproved of a California Court of Appeals
opinion that applied California’s finality definition to a Korean judgment. The
Manco court held the rendering jurisdiction’s law controlled finality in the
enforcing court, and noted that to its knowledge no other court in the United
States had reached the same conclusion as that in Korea Water.274
d. Authentication or Certification of the Foreign Judgment
The 2005 Act states only that, “A party seeking recognition of a foreigncountry judgment has the burden of establishing that this [act] applies to the
foreign-country judgment.”275 The 2019 Registration Act at least implies, if not
directs, that the rendering jurisdiction’s law (Canadian federal or provincial)
controls authentication (or certification).276 This seems to be a settled issue and
no case law disputes this.
e. What Assets Are Subject to Execution
Related to damages objections, another question is what assets are subject
to execution in the enforcing state after the foreign judgment is domesticated.
270. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 4(b)(4) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).
271. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a)(2), cmt. 3 (limiting the
Act’s scope to final judgments).
272. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,
380 (1985).
273. Manco Contracting Co. (W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian, 195 P.3d 604 (Cal. 2008).
274. Id. at 611 (citing several consistent holdings from other states); see also Nicholas v. Env’t Sys. (Int’l)
Ltd., 499 S.W.3d 888, 898–900 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that rendering state’s law controls finality).
275. UNIF. FOREIGN -COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(c).
276. The 2019 Registration Act provides that, “[a] registration under subsection (a) must include: (1) a copy
of the Canadian judgment authenticated as accurate by the court that entered the judgment.” UNIF. REGISTRATION
OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 4(b)(1).

November 2020]

MONEY JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT

151

The convenient (and perhaps wrong) answer is that the enforcing jurisdiction’s
law governs enforcement procedures, including asset susceptibility. Logic
suggests that the enforcing state’s law would govern which assets are subject to
execution because at that point, the judgment has been domesticated in the
enforcing state. The Washington Supreme Court saw it differently in Shanghai
Commercial Bank Limited v. Kung Da Chang.277 In that case, Chang defaulted
on loan to Shanghai Commercial Bank in Hong Kong. The bank obtained a $9
million judgment from a Hong Kong court, then sought to enforce it in Chang’s
home state—Washington—and sought collection against Chang’s marital
property. That is, the bank filed against both husband and wife, where the wife
had not been a party to the loan, was not in the lawsuit, and may not have been
subject to Hong Kong jurisdiction. The Changs objected in the Washington
court, pointing out that Washington law barred enforcement against the marital
property in these circumstances. But the marital property was a proper target
under Hong Kong law. The Washington Supreme Court held that Hong Kong
law governed based on the loan’s choice of law clause (and again, she was not a
party to that agreement) and the court’s finding that Hong Kong had the most
significant relationship to the issue.278 In spite of this Washington result, there
should be valid arguments for asset susceptibility to be a question purely of the
enforcing state’s law. Those arguments’ validity may vary with the facts of
particular cases (such as party status or whether the asset was pledged as
security), but otherwise it is difficult to see asset execution—an in rem
procedure—as anything other than a local law question.
Yet another variation is what assets are subject to provisional remedies in
the enforcing court pending the foreign judgment’s domestication. The 2005 Act
does not address this, again because that Act requires the filing of a lawsuit and
litigation, even if summary. That lawsuit’s status as local litigation almost
certainly means that the enforcing state’s law governs provisional remedies. The
answer is the same with the 2019 Registration Act, but perhaps with a twist. The
2019 Registration Act speeds up domestication by presuming the Canadian
judgment to be enforceable though subject to a thirty-day waiting period for the
judgment debtor to raise defenses.279 Because of this quicker finality, the 2019
Registration Act bars the use of provisional remedies that dispose of the
judgment debtor’s property, but allows remedies under the enforcing state’s law
that secure the property.280 If the judgment creditor seeks to place a lien on the
judgment debtor’s property, what law governs exemption? The express answer
in the 2019 Registration Act is that the enforcing state’s law governs,281 but it’s
conceivable that Canadian law could be pertinent, especially where corporate
assets are at issue.

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Shanghai Com. Bank Ltd. v. Chang, 404 P.3d 62 (Wash. 2017).
Id. at 65–70.
See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 5.
See id.
See id. § 5(b).
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f. Privity with the Judgment Debtor—Who Is Subject to Execution?
Judgments may also be enforced in many cases against non-parties such as
successors in interest or asset holders such as banks. The 2005 Act does not
address privity with the judgment debtor because that issue requires addressing
in the litigation to domesticate the foreign-country judgment. The 2019
Registration Act, however, directs enforcement as to “the person against whom
recognition of the judgment through registration is sought”282 and “[a] person
against whom a Canadian judgment has been registered.”283 This creates the
possibility of filing against someone not named in the Canadian judgment. To
the extent the 2019 Registration Act allows filing against an alleged asset holder,
various arguments could be made about what law defines privity. The few cases
that have addressed this have split between the rendering forum’s law284 and the
enforcing forum’s law.285
g. Interest
In discussing judgment interest, both in this Article and with the enforcing
court, it is important to distinguish prejudgment and post-judgment interest.
Prejudgment interest is awarded as compensable damages in the final judgment
and will be subsumed in the judgment award. Once that foreign judgment
reaches the enforcing court, any question of the prejudgment interest will not be
subject to challenge because of the proscription on relitigating the merits. It
could be said that if the subject does arise, it should be governed by the rendering
jurisdiction’s law, but that point is unnecessary because the issue has been
finally decided.286
Post-judgment interest consists of the rate awarded in the final judgment
and the effective date from which it runs. Just as the prejudgment interest rate is
not subject to re-litigation, so should the rendering court’s award of post-

282. Id. § 6(a).
283. Id. § 7(a).
284. See Johnson v. Ventra Grp., Inc., 191 F.3d 732, 738–39 (6th Cir. 1999). Johnson obtained a judgment
in Ontario against Canadian company Manutec for breach of an employment contract. Id. at 737. After that,
Manutec went through corporate reorganization and became Ventra, which in a prior structure had been
Manutec’s parent. Id. Johnson filed his Canadian judgment in a Michigan state court, and Ventra removed it to
federal court. Id. To collect, Johnson had to prove that as a matter of Canadian law, Ventra was liable as successor
to Manutec’s assets. Id. at 737–38. The trial court ruled against Johnson on this and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. See id. at 738, 750.
285. See United Steelworkers, Local 1-1000 v. Forestply Indus., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 798, 802–03 (W.D.
Mich. 2010). Canadian judgment in favor of Canadian labor union and against Michigan-based steel company,
for violation of collective bargaining in Canada. Id. at 799–800. The Canadian judgment included damages
against Forestply and one officer/owner, but when the union filed in Michigan for enforcement, Forestply was
insolvent. Id. The union then sought enforcement against two of Forestply’s principals who were not named in
the Canadian judgment. Id. at 801. The enforcing court allowed this but required a trial to determine the new
defendants’ status as principals. Id. at 807.
286. In Sw. Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramón, the enforcing court found that a Mexican judgment on a
promissory note with a forty-eight percent prejudgment interest rate did not violate Texas public policy and
precluded relitigation in Texas. 169 F.3d 317, 319, 322–23 (5th. Cir. 1999).
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judgment interest be a precluded issue unless the judgment debtor can persuade
the enforcing court that it violates public policy.287
Although post-judgment interest is generally not re-litigable in regard to
the original award, it is subject both to calculation and change in the enforcing
court because of (1) the interest accrued after rendering but before filing in the
enforcing court, and (2) the interest accrued in the enforcing jurisdiction after
domestication. As with other enforcement procedures, this is a matter of the
enforcing court’s law. Although the 2005 Act does not address post-judgment
interest,288 the 2019 Registration Act does in Section 4(b)(6)(A), limited to
requiring the judgment creditor to list the interest rate awarded in the rendering
court, the effective date, and the portions of the judgment to which it applies.
Other issues are up to the enforcing jurisdiction’s law. Logic suggests that the
enforcing court would calculate the post-judgment interest accrued under the
rendering jurisdiction’s law (from issuance up to the date of domestication in the
enforcing jurisdiction), then include that amount in the new domesticated
judgment, and impose an appropriate post-judgment rate under the enforcing
state’s law.289
h. Evaluating Due Process, Fundamental Fairness, and Impartiality
Foreign-country judgment enforcement under both comity and the
Uniform Acts is replete with due process references and its synonyms. In stating
the common law standard, Hilton used terms like “full and fair trial,” “regular
proceedings,” and “impartial administration of justice,”290 rather than due
process, perhaps to avoid confusion with the United States meaning. The 2005
Act, however, uses “due process” as the basis for a mandatory and a
discretionary dismissal grounds. Section 4(b)(1) requires dismissal if the
enforcing court finds that the rendering court’s judicial system as a whole lacked
impartial tribunals or used procedures incompatible with due process.291 Section
4(c)(8) allows discretionary dismissal if the specific proceeding (rather than the
system in general) violated due process.292
In contemplating an enforcement or a defense, it is important to note that
the due process concept in the 2005 Act is not limited to familiar standards under
state or federal law in the United States. Although many (but not all) enforcing

287. See Hyundai Sec. Co. v. Lee, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 271–73 (Ct. App. 2015) (finding that the Korean
court’s post-judgment interest rate of twenty percent did not violate California public policy).
288. See generally UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. L. CMM’N
2005). There was no need because the 2005 Act’s requirement of filing a new lawsuit which, if successful,
produced a new local judgment. Id. § 7 cmt. 3. The 2019 Registration Act, in contrast, simply registers and
domesticates the Canadian judgment unless judgment debtor raises an appropriate challenge. UNIF.
REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 4(b)(6)(A) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).
289. In Hyundai Sec., the California court did exactly that, holding that the twenty percent Korean rate
would run from the date of the Korean judgment up to the date of domestication in California, and after that, the
California post-judgment rate of ten percent would be used. Hyundai Sec., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 273.
290. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
291. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1).
292. See id. § 4(c)(8).
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courts use the United States due process standard to assess amenability and
notice in the rendering court,293 other challenges to the foreign process should
be measured by a broader assessment. Specifically, for challenges under
Sections 4(b)(1), 4(c)(7), and 4(c)(8), the question is whether the foreign
proceeding conformed to what the Seventh Circuit has termed the “international
concept of due process.”294 As a comment the 2005 Act notes: “Procedural
differences, such as absence of jury trial or different evidentiary rules are not
sufficient to justify denying recognition under subsection (b)(1), so long as the
essential elements of impartial administration and basic procedural fairness have
been provided in the foreign proceeding.”295 The case law applying these elusive
standards do not exercise a choice of law as such, but instead conduct an
assessment of basic fairness.296 Although United States law may inform the due
process and fairness analysis, it should not define it. And while the standard is
vague, due process objections do prevail in some cases.297
i. Superseding Law in the Enforcing Court: Federal and
International
The enforcing court’s local law will govern most aspects of enforcement
but in some cases will be superseded by federal law or even international law.
One example of federal law is the SPEECH Act298 which Congress passed in
2010 in response to defamation judgments from foreign courts based on
statements made in the United States. Statements intentionally and originally
placed on the internet are often the source of the foreign court’s jurisdictional
assertion,299 but in one case a Canadian plaintiff based it on her ability to
download a book from the internet.300 SPEECH is an acronym for Securing the
Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act,301
which is also known as the Libel Tourism Act. Under the SPEECH Act, a
judgment creditor with a foreign defamation judgment must show that the
foreign law offers at least as much protection for speech as that protected by our
First Amendment and resulting case law. Three states have amended their
foreign-country money judgment Acts to provide extra defense against
defamation judgments rendered in foreign countries. Two states—California and
293. See supra notes 178–187 and accompanying text.
294. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2000).
295. UNIF. FOREIGN -COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 cmt. 5.
296. See Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477.
297. See DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 935 F.3d 381, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2019) (declining a
Moroccan judgment); Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining a Liberian
judgment rendered during the Liberian Civil War).
298. Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 4101–05 (2018).
299. See Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 483–84, 496 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Nova
Scotia defamation judgment regarding statements made on a website based in Mississippi).
300. See Pontigon v. Lord, 340 S.W.3d 315, 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting an Ontario defamation
judgment arising from a book written in Missouri which the Canadian judgment creditor was able to download
on her computer).
301. 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–05.
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Oklahoma—amended their versions of the 2005 Act302 and Florida amended its
1962 Act.303 The amendments do not appear to be from a uniform or
standardized statute.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act304 is another example. The FSIA
applies to both state and federal courts for any claim filed against a foreign state
as defined in the Act.305 It governs the immunity of foreign countries and their
subsidiaries,306 and in doing so addresses personal jurisdiction, service of
process, governing law for the underlying claim, and subject matter jurisdiction
if the claim is filed in federal court. The FSIA is premised on claims filed
originally in a court in the United States, but by its wording also applies to
assertions of judicial jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign for judgment
execution purposes.307 If a Canadian court renders a judgment against a foreign
sovereign and the judgment creditor then attempts to enforce it under the 2019
Registration Act, the filing in the enforcing state (state or federal court) would
have to comply with the FSIA. Several enforcing courts have applied the FSIA
to recognitions under the 1962 Act or the 2005 Act, generally without question
as to the FSIA’s applicability. There have been four 2005 Act cases in the past
two years, all in the District of Columbia.308 An interesting question is whether
the FSIA governs or at least assesses the rendering court’s jurisdiction. In
Commissions Import Export, S.A. v. Republic of Congo, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals held that it did.309
If the United States signs on to the new Hague Judgments Conventions310
(or any other judgments treaty), it will preempt any inconsistent aspects of state
enforcement law, although the Convention appears compatible with both the
2005 Act and the 2019 Registration Act.311 In addition, if the United States
eventually ratifies the Hague Choice of Court Convention,312 the 2019
Registration Act may inform contested issues on forum clauses in establishing

302. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1725 (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 718A (2015).
303. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.6055 (2019).
304. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–11.
305. See id. § 1603.
306. See id. § 1603(b).
307. See id. § 1610 (referring to execution “upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a
State”).
308. See Comm’ns Imp. Exp., S.A. v. Republic of the Congo, 118 F. Supp. 3d 220 (D.D.C. 2018); BCB
Holdings Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 232 F. Supp. 3d 28 (D.D.C. 2017); Cont’l Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Fed.
Gov’t of Nigeria, 603 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015); SACE S.p.A. v. Republic of Para., 243 F. Supp. 3d 21
(D.D.C. 2017).
309. See Comm’ns Imp., 118 F. Supp. 3d at 226–28.
310. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial
Matters, supra note 37.
311. Id. at art. 13 (“The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or registration for
enforcement, and the enforcement of the judgment, are governed by the law of the requested State unless this
Convention provides otherwise.”); see also id. at art. 15 (allowing for alternative enforcement under national
law).
312. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 33.
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the rendering court’s jurisdiction, or in challenging that jurisdiction if it
conflicted with the parties otherwise valid choice.313
Apart from possible treaty application, customary international law has
applicable provisions even though they are less likely to be used by enforcing
courts. Specifically, customary international law echoes the due process clause’s
requirement that personal jurisdiction and choice of law (legislative jurisdiction)
be based on a reasonable connection between the parties, the dispute, and the
forum.314
Other issues can arise inside or outside the terms of the 2019 Registration
Act. As to which law governs, the default rule should be that the enforcing state’s
law governs, either through its local law regarding judgment enforcement or
through its conflict of laws rule.
E. PARALLEL AND COLLATERAL LITIGATION
A conflicting judgment is a defense to recognition under the 2005 Act, and
accordingly to registration under the 2019 Registration Act.315 There are no
reported cases raising that defense, but parallel or collateral litigation can affect
enforcement in other ways. With any parallel (that is, coinciding) litigation, the
first lawsuit to final judgment will have whatever preclusive effect is appropriate
against the remaining lawsuit or lawsuits.316
Otter Valley Foods, Inc, v. Aliki Foods, LLC,317 involved parallel litigation
in Connecticut and Ontario regarding frozen food products. Otter Valley was a
Canadian manufacturer of frozen food products and had various contracts with
Aliki, a Connecticut marketer of frozen foods. In 2005, the parties renegotiated
their agreement so that Aliki could pay down its accumulated debt to Otter. Then
in 2007, Otter shipped contaminated food to Aliki which had to be recalled. Aliki
sued Otter in federal court in Connecticut, and Otter then sued Aliki in Ontario
for breaching the 2005 agreement.318 The Ontario case was first to judgment,
and Otter filed for recognition in Connecticut. Aliki defended on grounds that
Otter’s claim was (1) repugnant to public policy because of the attorney fees
based on English law, (2) a compulsory counterclaim which required filing in
the Connecticut action (which still had not reached final judgment), and (3)
subject to a set-off from the Connecticut action.319 The enforcing Connecticut

313. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing section 4(c)(5) of the 2005 Act).
314. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402–04 (AM. L.
INST. 1987).
315. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(4) (UNIF. L. CMM’N
2005).
316. See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1877) (addressing both claim and issue
preclusion); see also HAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 1376–84.
317. Otter Valley Foods, Inc. v. Aliki Foods, LLC, No. CV094009931, 2010 WL 2573760 (Conn. Super.
Ct. May 21, 2010).
318. See id. at *1.
319. See id. at *2–3.
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court disagreed with all three defenses and ordered recognition of the Canadian
judgment.320
Otter Valley was only a two-lawsuit dispute. Kitchens Intern., Inc. v. Evans
Cabinet Corp., Ltd.,321 was a drawn-out dispute in Quebec, Georgia, New York,
and New Jersey regarding breach of contract. Kitchens obtained a Canadian
judgment and sought to enforce it in the United States and preclude Evans’s
parallel U.S. actions. Evans objected to the Canadian judgment on personal
jurisdiction grounds.322 The New Jersey trial court upheld the Canadian
judgment but the court of appeals reversed, citing the federal action in the First
Circuit where Evans’s personal jurisdiction objection was pending, and noting
that the Canadian judgment was not conclusive.323
Parallel cases may also be filed as declaratory judgment actions to be used
preclusively against an action on the merits. CE Design Ltd. v. HealthCraft
Products, Inc.324 is an example where a party—ING Insurance Company—used
Illinois’s version of the 1962 Act to gain recognition of its Canadian declaratory
judgment to preclude liability incurred by a policy holder. The dispute started
when CE Design obtained a judgment against Healthcraft in Illinois, then took
an assignment of Healthcraft’s insurance rights against ING Insurance Co., an
Ontario corporation. Meanwhile, ING filed an action in Canada seeking a
declaration that it had no duty to defend Healthcraft.325 When CE Design used
its assignment from Healthcraft to sue ING in Illinois, ING responded by filing
its Canadian declaratory judgment which led to the dismissal of Healthcraft’s
claim.326
Collateral litigation, filed after the foreign judgment is filed in the
enforcing state, is another variation. Drake v. Brady327 involved two default
judgments from Canadian small claims courts against two Minnesota couples
for unpaid bills to a Canadian resort, Northern Outpost (Brady). The judgment
creditor filed the two Canadian defaults in two Minnesota counties against the
respective couples. The couples then sued the resort in a separate Minnesota
court for deceptive trade practices and a declaration of the Canadian judgments’
unenforceability.328 The Minnesota trial court (the collateral attack court, not the
enforcing court) dismissed the judgment debtors’ declaratory judgment claim
for legal inadequacies, and found it had no jurisdiction over the Canadian
defendants for the deceptive trade claims.329 The Minnesota appellate court

320. See id. at *3–4.
321. Kitchens Int’l, Inc. v. Evans Cabinet Corp., 993 A.2d 252 (N.J. App. Div. 2010).
322. Id. at 253–56.
323. Id. at 256–58 (referring to Evans Cabinet Corp. v. Kitchen Int’l, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D. Mass.
2008), rev’d, 593 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2010)) (stating that fact issues regarding personal jurisdiction precluded
summary judgment).
324. CE Design Ltd. v. HealthCraft Prods., Inc., 79 N.E.3d 325 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
325. See id. at 327–29.
326. See id. at 329–33.
327. Drake v. Brady, No. A08-2137, 2009 WL 2928157, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009).
328. See id. at *1.
329. See id.
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affirmed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action but reversed regarding
Minnesota jurisdiction over the Canadian parties on the deceptive trade claim.330
The court remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the judgment
creditor’s preclusion claim (based on the Canadian judgments), which the trial
court had not addressed because of the jurisdictional dismissal.331
Investorshub.com, Inc. v. Mina Mar Group, Inc.332 is an example of using
a federal court for a collateral attack raising federal public policy.
Investorshub.com is a website based in the United States, which posted
derogatory comments about Mina Mar Group, based in Ontario with a subsidiary
in Texas. Mina Mar obtained an Ontario default judgment against Investorshub
and other defendants which it then filed in a Florida state court.333 In response,
Investorshub sued in federal court seeking a declaration that the Canadian
judgment was unenforceable under the SPEECH Act and under the Florida
version of the 1962 Act.334 During the pre-trial phase, Mina Mar conceded and
the court entered the declaratory judgment as a consent decree.335 This was an
effective use of a federal collateral attack, but unnecessary because the defense
could have been raised in the Florida state court.

CONCLUSION AND SPECULATIONS
The 2019 Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act offers a new
level of efficiency for civil money judgment enforcement between Canada and
the United States. Rather than a stand-alone statute, it supplements the 2005
Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act. But unlike the
2005 Act’s requiring “filing an action seeking recognition,” the 2019
Registration Act presumes the Canadian judgment’s enforceability and avoids
litigation unless the judgment debtor raises a defense.
That efficiency does not short-circuit due process safeguards. The 2019
Registration Act requires detailed information that both assists the court and
protects the judgment debtor. That detail—ranging from judgment
authentication to an accounting of the amount and interest already collected—
replicates the prima facie proof required in any summary judicial proceeding for
enforcement. Notice is also crucial. Where the 2005 Act implicitly requires
notice with the filing of a recognition lawsuit, the 2019 Registration Act
expressly requires both detailed information at the outset and service consistent
with the enforcing state’s rules for new lawsuit. In addition, the registering
attorney must attest to the judgment’s propriety, an express declaration of
validity as opposed to the imputed claim validity when filing an enforcing
lawsuit.
330. See id. at *2–5.
331. See id. at *6.
332. Investorshub.com, Inc. v. Mina Mar Grp., Inc., No. 4:11CV9-RH/WS, 2011 WL 12506239 (N.D. Fla.
June 20, 2011).
333. See id. at *1–2.
334. See id. at *2.
335. See id. at *3.
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Proper registration and completed notice trigger a thirty-day waiting period
after which the judgment is enforceable under local law unless the judgment
debtor files a petition to vacate. Stays are not automatic but available upon a
showing of likelihood of success. The concern that foregoing litigation exposes
people to invalid judgments fails to consider that the current lawsuit process
typically allows only thirty days to respond before default.
The registration process is a balance of efficiency and detail that aids the
court and protects the judgment debtor. Matched with its Canadian counterpart,
money judgment enforcement between Canada and the United States will be
shortened (by months in some cases), and costs reduced, without sacrificing the
judgment debtor’s defenses.
So what’s next? If the registration process is viable for Canadian
judgments, what does it offer for other foreign-judgment enforcement in the
United States, or for that matter between other countries? It is tempting to argue
that this registration process provides a model for wider use, and that may be. If
the concern is the filing of questionable or even fraudulent judgments from any
given country, that can be done now under the 2005 Act. As the 2019
Registration Act does for Canadian judgments, a wider registration process
would retain all the defenses and protection of the 2005 Act along with more
detailed filing and notice requirements.
That’s the argument for wider use but it’s not realistic, at least not yet. The
reason is that governments are inherently resistant to commands—executive,
legislative, or judicial—from other governments. This resistance exists even
between polities in the same system. In the United States, for example, we
needed constitutional compulsion for interstate judgment recognition, and even
then states resist.336 That inherent resistance to external judgments is not only
about the application process (such as registration), but the very idea of
domesticating foreign adjudication. A primary issue, then, is not so much
registration as it is recognition—what makes a foreign judgment acceptable for
domestication? Registration and other cross-border efficiencies won’t occur
without consensus on recognition standards.
That’s not to say that consensus on recognition is operationally necessary
for a registration process to work. It’s just to say that without recognition
consensus, the comfort level with registration won’t be there. The 2019 Hague
Judgments Convention,337 focused on recognition standards and deferring to
signatories for the recognition process (for example, registration or litigation),
appears to be a good vehicle to pursue that consensus widely. But consensus
need not be universal. Smaller groups—two, for example—can benefit as well.
The group may be defined by a common legal history, culture, trade, or location,
and it’s notable that all four factors are true of Canada and the United States.
336. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236–38 (1908) (finding that full faith and credit required
Mississippi to enforce Missouri judgment that violated Mississippi public policy); see also HAY ET AL., supra
note 5, at 1406–12 (discussing later cases).
337. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial
Matters, supra note 37.
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Wherever that alignment on recognition occurs, that group will be poised to
consider changing the application process to registration.338
In achieving agreement, it may be important to limit consensus to
recognition standards and defer to the enforcing state’s local law on some
fundamental concepts as well as the enforcement process. Although the use of
local law for much of enforcement is obvious and difficult to imagine otherwise,
the point is not its use but the sharp distinctions among states on a wide variety
of fundamental issues, including some involving international standards. These
polar differences, many discussed in Part III, can encourage forum shopping by
creditors and asset hiding by debtors. This is not to propose that states abandon
local control, but merely that greater harmonization on key issues would benefit
predictable judgment enforcement. Local control and local distinctions are
understandable in light of the inherent in rem nature of executing against local
assets, but greater alignment on crucial issues could lead to comprehensive
judgment conventions. But we are not there yet, even for sister-state
enforcement in the United States.339
Even without more alignment in the enforcing stage, we will see a growing
harmonization of judgment recognition standards, emanating from the 2019
Hague Judgments Convention or elsewhere. That standardization will in turn
lead to emphasis on more efficient application processes, and the 2019
Registration Act offers an excellent model.

338. While a comparative study beyond Canada and the United States is outside this Article’s scope, the
2007 Lugano Convention appears to create a registration procedure: “The judgment shall be declared enforceable
immediately on completion of the formalities in Article 53 without any review under Articles 34 and 35. The
party against whom enforcement is sought shall not at this stage of the proceedings be entitled to make any
submissions on the application.” Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters art. 41, Dec. 21, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 339) 3, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:22007A1221(03). The earlier European Union judgment
conventions merely referred to local law. See 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters art. 33, Dec. 31, 1972, 1968 O.J. (L 299) 32, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:41968A0927(01); Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters art. 33, Nov. 25, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A41988A0592. Of course, the full faith and
credit statute, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738, has mandated a simple authentication process for sister-state
judgment recognition in the United States since 1790. Although that can be described as an internal procedure,
it was not necessarily perceived that way at the time.
339. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998) (quoting McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v.
Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 325 (1839)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 (AM.
L. INST. 1971).
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IV. APPENDICES
A.

THE UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION
ACT (2005)

UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT340
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the [Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act].
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this [act]:
(1) “Foreign country” means a government other than:
(A) the United States;
(B) a state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession of the
United States; or
(C) any other government with regard to which the decision in this state as
to whether to recognize a judgment of that government’s courts is initially
subject to determination under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution.
(2) “Foreign-country judgment” means a judgment of a court of a foreign
country.
SECTION 3. APPLICABILITY.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), this [act] applies to a
foreign-country judgment to the extent that the judgment:
(1) grants or denies recovery of a sum of money; and
(2) under the law of the foreign country where rendered, is final,
conclusive, and enforceable.

340. Copyright © 2005 By National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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(b) This [act] does not apply to a foreign-country judgment, even if the
judgment grants or denies recovery of a sum of money, to the extent that the
judgment is:
(1) a judgment for taxes;
(2) a fine or other penalty; or
(3) a judgment for divorce, support, or maintenance, or other judgment
rendered in connection with domestic relations.
(c) A party seeking recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the
burden of
establishing that this [act] applies to the foreign-country judgment.
SECTION 4. STANDARDS FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGNCOUNTRY
JUDGMENT.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), a court of this
state shall recognize a foreign-country judgment to which this [act] applies.
(b) A court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment if:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due
process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant;
or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(c) A court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if:
(1) the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not receive
notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an
adequate opportunity to present its case;
(3) the judgment or the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the
judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United
States;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be determined
otherwise than by proceedings in that foreign court;
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action;
(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt
about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment; or
(8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was
not compatible with the requirements of due process of law.
(d) A party resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the
burden of establishing that a ground for nonrecognition stated in subsection (b)
or (c) exists.
SECTION 5. PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
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(a) A foreign-country judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of
personal jurisdiction if:
(1) the defendant was served with process personally in the foreign
country;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceeding, other than for the
purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the
proceeding or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant;
(3) the defendant, before the commencement of the proceeding, had agreed
to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter
involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign country when the
proceeding was instituted or was a corporation or other form of business
organization that had its principal place of business in, or was organized under
the laws of, the foreign country;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign country and the
proceeding in the foreign court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief]
arising out of business done by the defendant through that office in the foreign
country; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign
country and the proceeding involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising
out of that operation.
(b) The list of bases for personal jurisdiction in subsection (a) is not
exclusive.
The courts of this state may recognize bases of personal jurisdiction other
than those listed in
subsection(a) as sufficient to support a foreign-country judgment.
SECTION 6. PROCEDURE FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGNCOUNTRY JUDGMENT.
(a) If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought as an original
matter, the issue of recognition shall be raised by filing an action seeking
recognition of the foreign-country judgment.
(b) If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought in a pending
action, the issue of recognition may be raised by counterclaim, cross-claim, or
affirmative defense.
SECTION 7. EFFECT OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGNCOUNTRY JUDGMENT. If the court in a proceeding under Section 6 finds
that the foreign-country judgment is entitled to recognition under this [act] then,
to the extent that the foreign-country judgment grants or denies recovery of a
sum of money, the foreign-country judgment is:
(1) conclusive between the parties to the same extent as the judgment of a
sister state entitled to full faith and credit in this state would be conclusive; and
(2) enforceable in the same manner and to the same extent as a judgment
rendered
in this state.
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SECTION 8. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL OF
FOREIGNCOUNTRY JUDGMENT. If a party establishes that an appeal
from a foreign-country judgment is pending or will be taken, the court may stay
any proceedings with regard to the foreign-country judgment until the appeal is
concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the appellant has had sufficient time
to prosecute the appeal and has failed to do so.
SECTION 9. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. An action to recognize a
foreign-country judgment must be commenced within the earlier of the time
during which the foreign-country judgment is effective in the foreign country or
15 years from the date that the foreign-country judgment became effective in the
foreign country.
SECTION 10. UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION. In applying
and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states
that enact it.
SECTION 11. SAVING CLAUSE. This [act] does not prevent the
recognition under principles of comity or otherwise of a foreign-country
judgment not within the scope of this [act].
SECTION 12. EFFECTIVE DATE.
[(a) This [act] takes effect … .
[(b) This [act] applies to all actions commenced on or after the effective
date of
this [act] in which the issue of recognition of a foreign-country judgment
is raised.]
SECTION 13. REPEAL. The following [acts] are repealed:
(a) Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,
(b)
B.

THE UNIFORM REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT
(2019)

UNIFORM REGISTRATION OF
CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT341
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Uniform
Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act.
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this [act]:
(1) “Canada” means the sovereign nation of Canada and its provinces and
territories. “Canadian” has a corresponding meaning.
(2) “Canadian judgment” means a judgment of a court of Canada, other
than a judgment that recognizes the judgment of another foreign country.
SECTION 3. APPLICABILITY.
(a) This [act] applies to a Canadian judgment to the extent the judgment is
within the scope of [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act Section 3], if
341. Copyright © 2019 By National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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recognition of the judgment is sought to enforce the judgment.
(b) A Canadian judgment that grants both recovery of a sum of money and
other relief
may be registered under this [act], but only to the extent of the grant of
recovery of a sum of
money.
(c) A Canadian judgment regarding subject matter both within and not
within the scope
of this [act] may be registered under this [act], but only to the extent the
judgment is with regard
to subject matter within the scope of this [act]
SECTION 4. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN JUDGMENT.
(a) A person seeking recognition of a Canadian judgment described in
Section 3 to
enforce the judgment may register the judgment in the office of the [clerk]
of a court in which an
action for recognition of the judgment could be filed under [cite to Uniform
Foreign-Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act Section 6].
(b) A registration under subsection (a) must be executed by the person
registering the
judgment or the person’s attorney and include:
(1) a copy of the Canadian judgment authenticated [under [cite to state’s
law on authentication of a foreign-country judgment]] [in the same manner as a
copy of a foreign
judgment is authenticated in an action under [cite to Uniform ForeignCountry Money
Judgments Recognition Act Section 6]] as an accurate copy by the court
that entered the
judgment;
(2) the name and address of the person registering the judgment;
(3) if the person registering the judgment is not the person in whose favor
the judgment was rendered, a statement describing the interest the person
registering the judgment has in the judgment which entitles the person to seek
its recognition and enforcement;
(4) the name and last-known address of the person against whom the
judgment is being registered;
(5) if the judgment is of the type described in Section 3(b) or (c), a
description of the part of the judgment being registered;
(6) the amount of the judgment or part of the judgment being registered,
identifying:
(A) the amount of interest accrued as of the date of registration on the
judgment or part of the judgment being registered, the rate of interest, the part
of the judgment to which interest applies, and the date when interest began to
accrue;
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(B) costs and expenses included in the judgment or part of the judgment
being registered, other than an amount awarded for attorney’s fees; and
(C) the amount of an award of attorney’s fees included in the judgment
or part of the judgment being registered;
(7) the amount, as of the date of registration, of post-judgment costs,
expenses, and attorney’s fees claimed by the person registering the judgment or
part of the judgment;
(8) the amount of the judgment or part of the judgment being registered
which has been satisfied as of the date of registration;
(9) a statement that:
(A) the judgment is final, conclusive, and enforceable under the law of
the Canadian jurisdiction in which it was rendered;
(B) the judgment or part of the judgment being registered is within the
scope of this [act]; and
(C) if a part of the judgment is being registered, the amounts stated in the
registration under paragraphs (6), (7), and (8) relate to the part;
(10) if the judgment is not in English, a certified translation of the judgment
into English; and
(11) [a registration fee of $[____]] [the registration fee stated in [cite to
applicable statute or administrative rule]].
(c) On receipt of a registration that includes the documents, information,
and registration fee required by subsection (b), the [clerk] shall file the
registration, assign a [registration] docket
number, and enter the Canadian judgment in the court’s [registration]
docket.
(d) A registration substantially in the following form complies with the
registration requirements under subsection (b) if the registration includes the
attachments specified in the form:
SECTION 5. EFFECT OF REGISTRATION.
(a) Subject to subsection (b), a Canadian judgment registered under Section
4 has the same effect provided in [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act Section 7] for a judgment a court determines to be
entitled to recognition.
(b) A Canadian judgment registered under Section 4 may not be enforced
by sale or other
disposition of property, or by seizure of property or [garnishment] [trustee
process], until 31 days
after notice under Section 6 of registration is served. The court for cause
may provide for a
shorter or longer time. This subsection does not preclude use of relief
available under law of this
state other than this [act] to prevent dissipation, disposition, or removal of
property
SECTION 6. NOTICE OF REGISTRATION.
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(a) A person that registers a Canadian judgment under Section 4 shall cause
notice of registration to be served on the person against whom the judgment has
been registered.
(b) Notice under this section must be served in the same manner that a
summons and
[complaint] must be served in an action seeking recognition under [cite to
Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act Section 6] of a
foreign-country money judgment.
(c) Notice under this section must include:
(1) the date of registration and court in which the judgment was registered;
(2) the [registration] docket number assigned to the registration;
(3) the name and address of:
(A) the person registering the judgment; and
(B) the person’s attorney, if any;
(4) a copy of the registration, including the documents required under
Section 4(b); and
(5) a statement that:
(A) the person against whom the judgment has been registered, not later
than 30 days after the date of service of notice, may [petition] the court to vacate
the registration; and
(B) the court for cause may provide for a shorter or longer time.
(d) Proof of service of notice under this section must be filed with the
[clerk] of the court
SECTION 7. [PETITION] TO VACATE REGISTRATION.
(a) Not later than 30 days after notice under Section 6 is served, the person
against whom the judgment was registered may [petition] the court to vacate the
registration. The court for cause may provide for a shorter or longer time for
filing the [petition].
(b) A [petition] under this section may assert only:
(1) a ground that could be asserted to deny recognition of the judgment
under [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act]; or
(2) a failure to comply with a requirement of this [act] for registration of
the judgment.
(c) A [petition] filed under this section does not itself stay enforcement of
the registered
judgment.
(d) If the court grants a [petition] under this section, the registration is
vacated, and any act under the registration to enforce the registered judgment is
void.
(e) If the court grants a [petition] under this section on a ground under
subsection (b)(1), the court also shall render a [judgment] denying recognition
of the Canadian judgment. A [judgment] rendered under this subsection has the
same effect as a [judgment] denying recognition to a judgment on the same
ground under [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition
Act].
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SECTION 8. STAY OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT
PENDING DETERMINATION OF [PETITION]. A person that files a
[petition] under Section 7(a) to vacate registration of a Canadian judgment may
request the court to stay enforcement of the judgment pending determination of
the [petition]. The court shall grant the stay if the person establishes a likelihood
of success on the merits with regard to a ground listed in Section 7(b) for
vacating a registration. The court may require the person to provide security in
an amount determined by the court as a condition of granting the stay
SECTION 9. RELATIONSHIP TO UNIFORM FOREIGNCOUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT.
(a) This [act] supplements [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act] and that [act], other than [cite to Uniform ForeignCountry Money Judgments Recognition Act Section 6], applies to a registration
under this [act].
(b) A person may seek recognition of a Canadian judgment described in
Section 3 either:
(1) by registration under this [act]; or
(2) under [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition
Act
Section 6].
(c) Subject to subsection (d), a person may not seek recognition in this state
of the same judgment or part of a judgment described in Section 3(b) or (c) with
regard to the same person
under both this [act] and [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act
Section 6].
(d) If the court grants a [petition] to vacate a registration solely on a ground
under Section
7(b)(2), the person seeking registration may:
(1) if the defect in the registration can be cured, file a new registration under
this
[act]; or
(2) seek recognition of the judgment under [cite to Uniform ForeignCountry Money Judgments Recognition Act Section 6].
SECTION 10. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND
INTERPRETATION. In applying and construing this uniform act,
consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with
respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
SECTION 11. TRANSITIONAL PROVISION. This [act] applies to the
registration of a Canadian judgment entered in a proceeding that is commenced
in Canada on or after [the effective date of this [act]].
SECTION 12. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [act] takes effect ….

